

# THE GERMAN EMPIRE OF CENTRAL AFRICA


By **EMIL ZIMMERMANN**

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY EDWYN BEVAN










**CENTRAL AFRICA**



**THE GERMAN EMPIRE OF  
CENTRAL AFRICA**



THE  
GERMAN EMPIRE  
*of*  
CENTRAL AFRICA

*As the Basis of a New German  
World-Policy*

BY  
EMIL ZIMMERMANN

*Translated from the Original German*

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY  
EDWYN BEVAN

NEW YORK  
GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY





## CONTENTS

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION . . . . .	vii
1.—OSKAR KARSTEDT . . . . .	ix
2.—PAUL LEUTWEIN . . . . .	xii
3.—HANS DELBRÜCK . . . . .	xiv
4.—HERMANN ONCKEN . . . . .	xviii
5.—PAUL ROHRBACH . . . . .	xx
6.—FRANZ KOLBE . . . . .	xxiii
7.—FREIHERR ALBRECHT VON RECHENBERG . . . . .	xxvii
8.—DAVIS TRIETSCH . . . . .	xxix
9.—EMIL ZIMMERMANN . . . . .	xxxiii
10.—DR. WILHELM SOLF . . . . .	xliv
11.—“DEUTSCHE WELTPOLITIK UND KEIN KRIEG” . . . . .	xlix
12.—BRITISH OPPOSITION TO <i>MITTEL-AFRIKA</i> . . . . .	lv

THE GERMAN EMPIRE OF CENTRAL AFRICA	
	PAGE
I.—POSITION AS A WORLD-POWER . . . . .	1
II.—THE WAY TO BECOME A WORLD-POWER . . . . .	5
III.—THE BUILDING UP OF GERMAN WORLD-POWER . . . . .	16
IV.—THE OVERSEA FOUNDATIONS OF GERMAN WORLD- POWER . . . . .	22
V.—THE WHITE MAN IN CENTRAL AFRICA . . . . .	37
VI.— <i>MITTEL-AFRIKA</i> AS A FACTOR IN THE ECONOMIC STRUGGLE . . . . .	49
VII.—THE ORGANIZATION OF GERMAN <i>MITTEL-AFRIKA</i>	56

## INTRODUCTION

**P**RACTICALLY all Germans, with the exception of the Minority Socialists, are agreed that when this war, provoked by Germany and Austria-Hungary, comes to a final settlement, somehow or somewhere Germany must be able to point to a gain, in order to prove that the huge agonizing effort was not made for nothing. There are, on the other hand, notable varieties of opinion in Germany as to the direction in which the gain is to be sought. The Pan-Germans declare that the thing that matters supremely is that Germany should annex more territory in Europe—especially the Flanders coast and the French mining-districts of Briey and Longwy. Unless Germany gets these, they say, she will have lost the war. A very large body of opinion, on the other hand, is strongly opposed to the “Flanders politicians,” as Emil Zimmermann calls them in his book. This body of opinion stands for the formula “no annexations”—none, at any rate, in Europe. It says that even if the war were to end on the basis of the *status quo* in Europe, Germany would have won. It is often described as “Moderate” opinion, as against the Pan-German annexationists. It differs from the Pan-Germans also in internal politics. Pan-German opinion is mainly reactionary and anti-democratic; “Moderate” opinion is, generally speaking, in favour of democratic reform, of a government more representative of the people and more responsible to the people. Very often you may see utterances of “Moderate” circles in Germany, protesting against annexations and

advocating democracy, commented upon in English papers, as proving that the Germans are abandoning all ambitious schemes. This book is the product of such "Moderate" opinion; it will perhaps serve to show that the comforting view of the "Moderates" needs reconsideration.

The "Moderates," no less than the Pan-Germans, desire that Germany should be able to show her position strengthened after the war. There are two sub-varieties of "Moderate" opinion with regard to the direction in which Germany is to gain. One is the *Mittel-Europa* school. This lays the emphasis upon a closer union, political, military and economic, between the German Empire and its Allies—Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey—in such wise that there is a continuous belt of German power from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf, a great Central-European realm capable of defying the world. This scheme could be realized with practically no annexation. The other sub-variety sees Germany's future greatness secured by a great Empire in tropical Africa, in *Mittel-Afrika*, extending right across the Continent from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. This involves considerable annexations, but annexations in Africa, not Europe. Very often the two schemes—*Mittel-Europa* and *Mittel-Afrika*—are held both together. But commonly even those who hold both ideas lay greater stress on one than on the other.

It may be questioned whether any strong spontaneous interest is felt by the German masses in the lost oversea colonies. We find, for example, the champions of the Colonial Idea occasionally complain of wide-spread popular indifference, though they note with satisfaction that "the war has turned the great mass of the working-classes, who had hitherto been indifferent to the Colonial movement, or even averse from it, into its most convinced friends" (Dr. Solf,

Secretary of State for the Colonies, quoted in the *Kreuz-Zeitung* for January 9, 1918). But if gain is not to be had in other directions, then the gain of colonial territory acquires value as a salve to national pride, which would be wounded, if the war ended in loss all round. It is perhaps for this reason that of late the idea of the African Empire has seemed to be in the ascendant.

It is important that the English-speaking peoples should have a clear statement put before them of this German programme, a statement exhibiting the hopes and intentions attached to it in the German mind. A circumstantial statement by a German is of special value, as a first-hand document, and this is just what we have in the book by Emil Zimmermann here translated. The book was written for German readers; British and American readers may be trusted to draw their own conclusions.

But Emil Zimmermann is not the only publicist who is busy displaying the magnificent possibilities of Central Africa to the German people and working up enthusiasm for the scheme. It may be well, in an introduction to Zimmermann's book, to take some note of statements of the same gospel by others. It will be seen how closely parallel all the statements are, and their combination may give the British reader, like a composite photograph, a good idea of what *Mittel-Afrika* means.

#### 1.—OSKAR KARSTEDT

We may begin with a summary statement of it by Dr. Oscar Karstedt, editor of the *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, in a little pamphlet called *Koloniale Friedensziele (Colonial Peace-Aims)*, which is one of a series published by Duncker in Weimar for the purposes of popular enlightenment. He begins by explaining generally that the Germans need tropical

dependencies for two reasons, (1) in order to have a supply of raw-materials for their industries without depending upon foreigners, (2) in order to have naval stations overseas. As to the latter Dr. Karstedt says:—

Oversea fleets in the future will have no more value than old scrap-iron, unless they have the support of *points d'appui* overseas which would be capable of serving at any moment as munition-depôts, coaling-stations, docks, etc.—(p. 10.)

Think for a moment how far more deadly the work of German cruisers might have been, if Dar-es-Salaam on the Indian Ocean or Lüderitz Bay and Duala on the Atlantic had been fully fitted-out naval bases, in which our ships would have had facilities for getting in fresh supplies or effecting repairs!—(p. 11.)

He presently rehearses the *Mittel-Afrika* gospel as follows:

An appropriation, as extensive as possible, of French, English, Belgian and Portuguese possessions in Central Africa would yield another advantage besides those already specified. The colonial possessions which have hitherto belonged to us in Africa had an essentially disconnected, scattered character. . . . Togo, the Cameroons, German South-West Africa and German East Africa had no kind of connexion with each other by land. English, French, Belgian and Portuguese territories intruded between them from all sides. Since, moreover, in consequence of the defect of our naval policy, it was impossible to defend our colonies from the sea, they lay one and all at the outbreak of war like isolated fortresses, round which an unbroken line of investment could be drawn. In this fact lies the principal reason why they all, with the exception of East Africa, fell comparatively quickly a prey to the enemies who assailed them from all sides. At the same time it was shown that the larger tropical colonies are, the easier they are to hold. The Cameroons and East Africa, the two largest German colonies in Africa, one over 750,000 square kilometres, the other a full million square kilometres, were able to hold out, although wholly unprepared for a war with European enemies, in a way which the most expert opinion could not have foreseen. . . . The secret is to be found in the stupendous difficulties which every

extensive tropical area, owing to climate and other physical impediments, offers to an invader. If even a Napoleon could not but fail in the attempt to conquer gigantic Russia, could not dominate so vast a space, a German *Mittel-Afrika*, reaching from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, would, under the physical conditions of the tropics, be practically invulnerable. Tropical colonial territory finds its best security in its size. The more extensive and coherent the territory is, the better it is protected against attack.

A German *Mittel-Afrika*, as it is here sketched in outline, would besides yield the great advantage, from the point of view of world-policy, that it would set a bar, once for all, to England's effort to become mistress of Africa from the Cape to Cairo. Within the territory, further, there would be enough places on the coast, which, when properly fortified and equipped, would be capable of furnishing Germany with the naval bases which it absolutely *must have* upon the Atlantic and the Indian Oceans. Such a German overseas Empire in Africa would be able to bid defiance to the strongholds of British power in Africa (Egypt and South Africa), the mainstays of the whole British world-power. It would give us, not only a great part of what we want in order to be economically independent of England, but it would also put the means into our hands of *striking England home* at any moment with the help of our navy and the man-power latent in this future dominion.—(pp. 13-16.)

Some of the exponents of *Mittel-Afrika*, as we shall see, would be willing for Germany to give up many of her former colonies, if thereby she could secure the Central-African continuous Empire. But Dr. Karstedt is unwilling to give up anything except Kiao-chou—not the South Sea colonies, not German South-West Africa. Of his ambitions in the South Seas we need say nothing here, where we are concerned with Africa. As to the dimensions of the German African domain, Karstedt says:—

With regard to the extent of our colonial domain in Africa, the first consideration must be the rounding-off of our territory in such a way that the German possessions, which have hitherto been wholly detached from each other, should be welded together into a single block by the

annexation of enemy territory. Such a block, by its magnitude, would furnish a sufficient guarantee that any fresh attempt to conquer the country by force of arms would be to bite upon granite. The Belgian Congo by itself might serve the purpose of making the connexion between German East Africa and the Cameroons. But the Belgian Congo alone, even when our former colonies are joined to it, could never give us economic independence in the matter of raw materials. For that purpose we need in particular an extension of our territory towards the North-West by the acquisition of the French West-African possessions and, if possible, that of British Nigeria and the Gold Coast.—(pp. 18-19.)

There is another point upon which Dr. Oskar Karstedt insists. German prestige has been lowered before the eyes of the natives: atonement must also be made before their eyes.

Nothing makes any impression upon the native except what he sees with his own eyes. He has seen the Germans, his former lords and masters (*Beherrscher*), in a condition of the deepest humiliation, a humiliation which no doubt our enemies designed for the special reason of its effect upon native psychology. Even if, in the peace negotiations, the demand for a personal compensation to the victims of these brutalities is enforced, that will not do away with the great, perhaps the irreparable, injury which the prestige of the Germans, and their colonial future in Africa, has sustained. Successful colonial policy among the lower races makes the unquestioned prestige of the colonizing people a fundamental consideration. A people whose representatives have been treated before the eyes of the natives as the Germans have been, is burdened in consequence of these things with a handicap affecting all its future colonial activity, which may be a crushing one if the proper measures are not taken. Whatever else therefore happens, care *must* be taken that such an *atonement* is made before the eyes of the natives as may be most suitable to impress people of their psychology and ideas.—(p. 21.)

## 2.—PAUL LEUTWEIN

Another writer who has made *Mittel-Afrika* his special theme is Dr. Paul Leutwein, the son of General Theodor Leutwein, who was Governor of German South-West Africa



from 1898 to 1905. I have before me a little book of some 50 pages called *Mittel-Europa—Mittel-Afrika*, published by Paul Leutwein in 1917.

He draws the same conclusions as Dr. Karstedt from the surprisingly tough resistance put up by the German colonies in this war:—

If the three colonies (South-West Africa, the Cameroons, East Africa), severed as they were from each other and unprepared, have been a really positive factor among the forces engaged in this war, how much greater would be the effect of a single great colonial Empire, fitted out with all the means of modern scientific warfare against every hostile attack by land or sea! Such a colonial dominion, in view of the experiences of this war, would be absolutely invincible. —(p. 47.)

Leutwein states the *Mittel-Afrika* scheme very much in the same terms as Karstedt, but he has a more sober sense of the uncertainty of the future, which must throw upon all imperial projects a shadow of doubt. He says:—

The course of the war in the colonies has taught us that small colonial territories are scarcely capable of serious defence. These therefore we must in the future renounce. Further, the disconnectedness of our colonial possessions, far-scattered and without good frontiers, has made its disadvantages sensibly felt. . . . It is natural that an urgent desire should now exist that our colonial territory should take a new shape. . . . It has been proclaimed in many quarters that the honour of the German Empire requires that we should get back *all* our colonies. This point of view is sentimental, and, besides that, it is not true. By means of equivalent compensation, territorial or commercial, Germany's honour would be no less safeguarded and at the same time the way made easier for an agreement with our present enemies. . . . Many colonial politicians have come more and more to the conviction that an extensive territory in Central Africa, bordering both on the Indian Ocean and on the Atlantic, would afford the most favourable conditions for our future colonial activity. This domain would have to include our most important posses-

sions—the Cameroons, East Africa and the northern half of South-West Africa, and be amalgamated into a single whole by the addition of the Belgian Congo, together with strips of territory from the British, French, and Portuguese possessions and from British South Africa. The precise delimitation of German *Mittel-Afrika* had better be left undiscussed on grounds of political sagacity. *Careful memoranda have been drawn up on the subject, which must for the present remain confidential.* Only let so much be said: German *Mittel-Afrika*, as a field for the life of peoples, as an economic factor, and as a basis of political power, will be found to satisfy all requirements. The thought guiding its delimitation has been to provide a good prospect of success for the necessary negotiations with regard to give-and-take arrangements, and to draw the new frontiers in such a way as to give the least possible occasion for friction later on. The scheme *includes a maximum and a minimum demand* between which, according to the ultimate issue of the war, and according to the skill of our negotiators, the final delimitation will in all probability be drawn.—(pp. 5051.)

### 3.—HANS DELBRÜCK

In the front rank of those who preach *Mittel-Afrika* is Dr. Hans Delbrück, one of Germany's leading historians and publicists, author of a standard work on the Art of War from ancient times, and the successor of Treitschke, in the editorial chair of the great monthly periodical, the *Preussische Jahrbücher*. In his book *Bismarcks Erbe*, published in 1915, he wrote:—

The most sure of all modes of colonization is that by agricultural settlers (*Bauernkolonie*). . . . But colonies of this kind we cannot think of establishing, for the simple reason that we have no surplus population of workers on the land (*Bauern*). Our whole oversea emigration has sunk since the middle of the nineties to between twenty and thirty thousand souls a year, whilst at the same time we employ in Germany near on a million foreign labourers and workmen, Russians, Poles, Ruthenians, Slovaks, Italians, Scandinavians. Germany is not a country from which there is a flow of population from within outwards, but a country

into which there is a flow of population from outside. The peasant-farmers and agricultural labourers, who are suitable for settlement on the land, we need most urgently at home, and have very few whom we can afford to send overseas. The people who must fill our colonies and must give them their special characteristics are the *upper stratum*—the thousands of men of medium or of high education whom our rich school-system continues incessantly to turn out, and for whom we cannot find adequate occupation in the Fatherland. Men in their thirties, in the prime of their strength, who have acquired all the knowledge and all the skill necessary for a large circle of activities, sit here amongst us with nothing or little to do, and wait for some post with mean remuneration. These are the men whom we must send out, as technical experts, merchants, planters, doctors, inspectors, officers and civil servants, to rule over the great multitudes of the lower races, just as the English rule over India. But it cannot meet the case simply to spread out these upper strata here and there over a few, greater or smaller, areas; the only way of attaining a durable and secure gain for our nation is to constitute a continuous dominion, large enough to contain regions of different physical characteristics, which supplement each other and lend each other mutual support and strength. A very large continuous extent of territory, if it is under one central administration, acquires a certain political coherence; the fact that it is a single customs-area creates connexions and interests which are not lightly dissolved. Towns with any considerable white population and their own communal life require a very large *hinterland*. In order to bind such an oversea Empire quite firmly to the mother-country, some portions at any rate of the dominion must be of such a kind that a German community may maintain and propagate itself there—not a changing community only, but one planted in the soil, possibly in some places even an agricultural one. . . .

—(pp. 192-195.)

The first and most important of all the national demands which we must raise at the future Peace Congress must be for a really big colonial Empire, a *German India*. The Empire must be large enough to be capable of conducting its own defence in the event of war. A really big territory no enemy can completely occupy. A really big territory feeds its own troops and contains abundant man-power for reserves and militia. When the principal points are linked up by railways, the various districts are able to furnish each other mutual support. A really big territory can have its

own factories of ammunition and implements of war. A really big territory can have its harbours and coaling-stations. . . .—(p. 202.)

Is Central Africa—the region which one naturally first thinks of—capable, even in its largest extent, of meeting all these requirements? Has it a suitable soil? Is it fertile enough—fertile, I mean, not only in the merely physical sense, but all around? Can it bear the weight we would put upon it? Or should we rather turn our thoughts to Further India or Cochin China? This is not the place to discuss these questions.—(p. 206.)

A footnote runs:—

In order to obviate misunderstandings, I should like to add expressly that the Belgian and French Congo alone would not suffice to make the *German India* which we must strive for and which we must claim according to our success in the war. These equatorial regions may, it is true, yield riches later on, which to-day we can hardly imagine, but for the next generation, in consequence of their extremely thin population, they must remain unremunerative, indeed, cost more than they bring. Not till the rich surrounding lands, *now in English possession*, are joined to them will the adequate material basis for a German India be there.—(p. 206.)

The question whether Africa was capable of furnishing the requirements for the “German India,” which Hans Delbrück left unanswered in 1915, he has since then answered by an emphatic Yes. He has made *Mittel-Afrika* together with the German control of the Turkish Empire an essential part of his programme. As lately as last June (1917) he wrote in the *Preussische Jahrbücher*:

Supposing that either by victories on land or by the submarine war we so far brought England down that, in spite of the help of America, she gave up further fighting and was willing to concede us a direct or indirect dominion over Belgium, even so we ought to say: “Not Belgium, but Africa; not the coalfields of Charleroi, but Nigeria; not

Zeebrügge, but the Azores, Madeira, and the Cape Verde Islands; not Antwerp, but Lagos, Zanzibar, and Uganda, and Gibraltar for Spain. Not economic advantages by commercial treaties wrung from the enemy, but war-indemnities either in cash down or in raw materials. . . .”

If our victory is great enough, we may hope to unite the whole of Central Africa together with our old South-West under our hand—Senegambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, Dahomey, populous Nigeria with his harbour Lagos, the Cameroons, the luxuriant islands of San Thomé and Principe, the French and the Belgian Congo, Angola with its great potentialities and its excellent harbours, the region of Katanga rich in minerals, Northern Rhodesia, Nyassaland, Mozambique with Delagoa Bay, Madagascar, German East Africa, Zanzibar, Uganda, in addition to this the great well-constructed harbour of Ponta Delgada in the Azores, one of the most important and most frequented coaling-stations in the world, and Horta, one of the most important central stations of the Transatlantic Telegraph cable. “There are very few points in the Atlantic Ocean so admirably situated for purposes of traffic, of such importance from the point of view of political geography, and of such strength from the point of view of military and naval strategy as the Azores will be, so soon as they pass into the possession of a Power with a strong fleet,” so Hans Meyer writes in *Deutsche Politik* (Heft 20). To-day they belong to Portugal, which is at war with us. To Portugal belong also to-day the Cape Verde Islands with the harbour of Porta Grande, likewise one of the most frequented coaling-stations of the Eastern Atlantic. . . .

Is it true that we should get no enjoyment out of a colonial Empire, that we should be only in the position of “precarious tenants” unless we permanently kept England intimidated by our possession of the Flemish coast? There can be no more baseless superstition? Even suppose the U-boats failed to end England’s sea-hegemony for good in this war, even suppose England remained permanently our superior on sea—even so, that Central-African Germany would be strong enough in itself to repel every attack from outside. Has not our East Africa, as it is, maintained itself for nearly three years with nothing but its own diminutive forces? But we should so equip our African Empire with weapons and munition factories and depôts that it would be able to hold its own against a world of enemies. By means of our mercantile U-boats it would remain in communication with the home country, even supposing the English were once more

complete masters of the open seas. A certain number of war U-boats stationed there would even defend the islands and their harbours against English men-of-war.

Will the English ever concede us such a colonial Empire? I hope they will be compelled to do so. If they are confronted with the choice of either allowing us to have these colonies or of seeing us establish a direct or indirect dominion over Belgium, it will come easier to them to let us have the colonial Empire.

#### 4.—HERMANN ONCKEN

Another name scarcely less well-known than that of Hans Delbrück is that of the Heidelberg Professor of History, Hermann Oncken, the editor of the great German universal history. Oncken, like Delbrück, is a "Moderate," an opponent of the Pan-Germans, and was one of the men of distinction who joined the "German National Committee for the Preparation of an Honorable Peace," formed in the summer of 1916 to combat the Pan-German propaganda and support Bethmann Hollweg. A few months ago (in 1917) he published a small book entitled *Das alte und das neue Mittel-Europa* (*The Old and the New Mittel-Europa*). In the course of this he devotes some pages to *Mittel-Afrika*:—

Completely to upset the English calculations, it will be necessary that the German war programme, instead of confining itself to *Mittel-Europa*, should mark out in firm outline yet another attainable aim on beyond. This aim would not consist in annexations on the West [the Pan-German programme], which we might feel disposed to demand in view of the military situation, but in utilizing our military successes, which have given us pawns outside our frontiers in Belgium and Northern France, *in order to obtain compensations in Africa*. If England to-day is prosecuting the war with such intense efforts, that is in order to deprive us of these pawns; unless she recovers them she cannot safely garner in her colonial gains and fight the economic war through to a victorious end. England is fighting for a war-aim which lies outside Europe. We, on our side, are fighting in Flanders and Champagne, in the first instance, indeed,

against the implacable will which desires to tear German land away from the body of the Empire, but at the same time indirectly in order to get back our colonial territory, and to increase it. *We are fighting for an Empire in Central Africa.*

Our experience in the war has taught us that our scattered colonial possessions could not be held in war against the British sea-power. To that extent the words which Bismarck addressed to the English, when we first entered upon a colonial policy, have proved true: "We know that you could attack our colonies successfully, and that we could not retaliate, because you have command of the sea." What we want therefore is a colonial Empire which we do not hold by England's good pleasure, an Empire so self-sufficing that it can draw upon its own forces for its defence. The fact that a numerically quite weak body of German heroes could hold East Africa for three years has proved that a largish oversea country, with a numerous population, *can* be defended by its own resources, even if cut off from the mother-country. After this experience we are entitled to say that a German Africa which stretched right across the body of the African Continent, would really possess, in a yet much higher degree, the capability of defending itself. Indeed, if the military communications and the native man-power were properly organized, if naval stations and coaling-stations were established in connexion with our new arm, the U-boat, a continuous territory of adequate extent could be rendered as good as unassailable. If before the war the disconnected character of our colonial possessions constituted a weakness in our world-possession, the bringing of them together would mean such a strengthening of our position as would have effects radiating outwards, and make our power in the world tell far beyond our own frontiers (*eine Stärkung von innen heraus, die sich auch nach aussen hin machtpolitische Geltung verschaffen wird*). It is not the case therefore that unless we have control of the Flemish coast, with the attendant naval advantages, we cannot feel secure in the possession of colonies, that in order to be able to defend our colonies against England we must hold in our hands, as an indispensable condition, the celebrated "pistol pointed at England's heart" [Antwerp]. There is another way, and a surer way.

We shall be able to make sacrifices at other points in order to gain an extensive compact colonial dominion. So long as it is a question of a restoration of the *status quo* all round, we shall insist on having back our possessions in the South Seas and in East Asia among the rest. If on the other hand the *status quo* is dropped, then we shall reconcile ourselves

to the loss of our other possessions in order to bring our African possessions into territorial connexion. For such a consolidation we shall have to get the main part of the Belgian Congo State and of the Portuguese colonies, *i. e.*, in part territories which the English before the war were prepared to recognize as belonging in principle to our sphere of influence. Local accommodations would not be ruled out, so long as East Africa, so gloriously defended, was not sacrificed. We should have to seek a completion of our domain in the West-African districts, which have such high economic value for us, and which France would have to cede in order to redeem the part of her soil in our occupation. One may emphatically assert that a colonial Empire of such an extent—always provided that it can be made as good as unassailable to correspond with our own position of unassailable power—would have far greater value for the whole economic system of *Mittel-Europa* than this or that piece of colonizable land in the East [*i. e.* in Russia], than this or that rectification of our frontier on the West, desirable as that might be from the point of view of our industries. A colonial Empire, if one takes a large view, might become a life-and-death matter for our economic policy. Even a strengthened *Mittel-Europa*, as we have emphasized already, would still be far from self-sufficing; in the matter, at any rate, of a whole number of important raw materials, vegetable fats and fodder-stuffs, cotton and rubber, it would have needs which could not be supplied from European soil (even if the frontiers of "Europe" be carried forward in any direction), but only from tropical or sub-tropical colonies. Only through the assured possession of such colonies should we attain at any rate a certain measure of self-sufficiency. Without such assured possession we should, in view of our enemies' plans for boycott, be in danger of sinking into a position of economic dependence, however great our military strength might be, and thereby becoming permanently a second-class Power.

On this condition alone should we be prepared to renounce all conquests in the West, and especially to give back undiminished the pawn which we hold in our hand—Belgium. . . .—(pp. 144-147.)

##### 5.—PAUL ROHRBACH

Dr. Paul Rohrbach, another man who occupies a foremost place among Germany's influential publicists, is, like Delbrück and Oncken, a strong advocate of *Mittel-Afrika*. Like them,



too, he is a stout opponent of the Pan-German scheme for annexations in Flanders. Already before the war he was known as the writer of books on the expansion of Germany overseas. In one of these, *Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt*, he indicated that although the existing German colonies were poor in extent, compared with the oversea dependencies of Great Britain and France, "the real epoch of colonial policy on the grand scale in Africa was for Germany still to come" (*dass die eigentliche Epoche grosser afrikanischer Kolonialpolitik uns noch bevorsteht*). Dr. Rohrbach now stands principally for the Berlin-to-Bagdad Idea and for a policy of uncompromising hostility to Russia. But he is anxious to insist that although he advocates, as the thing of most immediate urgency, Germany's obtaining control of the Near East, he does not regard this as the *final* satisfaction of Germany's claims, but as the necessary basis for more magnificent expansion later on:—

There are already almost 200 millions of men who speak English, and more than 400 millions more are under the influence of Anglo-Saxon supremacy and culture. Unless we, too, expand as a strong oversea people, the world will end by becoming Anglo-Saxon. We need territories in which to plant offshoots of our stock overseas and procure the raw materials of other climates upon German soil. In this sense our policy in the Near East is only the *preliminary step* (*Vorstufe*) in German world-policy, and nothing is more mistaken than to represent our plan with regard to Turkey as a *rival* to our colonial plan—or the other way round!— (*Die Hilfe*, May 25, 1916, p. 343.)

A few months later he wrote:—

Africa is one of the three worlds which are going through a process of reconstruction (*Umbau*) from within and from without before our eyes. . . . In Africa the thing needed is to bring the enormous quantities of utilizable ground and the enormous quantities of utilizable human labour-power which

now lie fallow into a fruitful and productive relation to each other—to the advantage of the black, and the advantage of the superior white, race. The German people must and shall secure its proportionate share in that work. Finally—and this is almost more important than any other point—Africa on its healthy uplands affords enough territory for settlement, upon which a prolific people may grow up, German in stock, rooted from African soil. Those are the aims which we set before ourselves; and if the war gives us for these purposes a broader territorial basis in Africa than we had before, it is our enemies whom we shall have to thank for it!—(*Die Hilfe*, November 2, 1916, p. 718.)

The unexpectedly long resistance offered by the German colonies in Africa confirmed, as we have seen, the hopes of the enthusiasts for *Mittel-Afrika*. In the same article from which we have last quoted, Rohrbach wrote:—

Our black soldiery has given a very good account of itself in East Africa. In the Cameroons, too, our black troops fought well, but the bravery and devotion to the German cause shown by the *askaris* of East Africa is something wonderful. This is another proof, if one were needed, that our way of handling natives, severe and at the same time just, is the right way for the Africans and *superior to the English system of spoiling them* (*dem englischen Verhüschelungssystem überlegen*).

In his own paper, *Deutsche Politik*, Rohrbach rebuked those who had suffered their hope as to the future German African Empire to grow faint. The war, he argued, was admittedly going to compel Germany's enemies to recognize the new Great Power of *Mittel-Europa*-plus-Turkey, and if it could do that, it could certainly compass the much smaller thing, compel Britain and France to give back to Germany her African colonies:—

That Botha will be seriously in a position, as soon as the war as a whole is decided, to refuse obedience to the British Government, when it instructs him to give back South-West Africa, is an idea which cannot be seriously entertained.—(*Deutsche Politik*, February 18, 1916.)

If Germany can compel its enemies to recognize *Mittel-Europa-plus-Turkey*, "then we can also compel them not only to give us back our colonies in Africa, *but to cede to us whatever we need.*"

## 6.—FRANZ KOLBE

In the number of *Deutsche Politik* for December 22, 1916, is an article by Franz Kolbe, explaining Germany's need of a big colonial Empire with all the stereotyped arguments. The necessity of a supply of raw materials for German industries from Germany's own territories is, as usual, put in the forefront. But Kolbe also indicates the importance of *Mittel-Afrika* as a factor in future wars between Germany and the British Empire:—

If German *Mittel-Africa* comes about and our former colonies are given back to us, German Central Africa, adequately supplied with munitions, could hold out for the longest war. The larger this German colonial Empire is, the more troops will it be able to furnish, the more risky will an attack upon it be for our enemies, and the more enemy troops will our colonial troops keep engaged in Africa in the event of war. The larger this German colonial Empire in *Mittel-Afrika* is, the greater part will it play in future naval warfare, on the supposition that the most important harbours—Duala, Dar-es-Salaam, etc.—are fitted out as naval bases.

Kolbe followed up the subject in the same periodical on February 2, 1917:—

We must take into consideration that the Peace is certain to bring us *a big increase of our colonial Empire. . . .* We may anticipate with assurance that our new colonial Empire will be capable of supplying a considerable part of our demand for certain raw materials, as soon as it is properly opened up, so that from year to year it will be able to furnish increasing quantities of raw materials to Germany. . . .—(p. 153.)

With regard to the value of African territory as land

for settlement—one may say that the value of German South-West Africa and of the uplands of German East Africa have never yet been sufficiently recognized; when Angola passes into our possession, we should acquire new territories there also, adapted for colonization by white men. . . . After the war we may expect with certainty a reflux of Germans on a large scale from various foreign countries, especially of German agriculturists. It will largely be a case of people who have already gained experience in tropical or sub-tropical agriculture. . . .

A discussion of the extent of the future colonial Empire is at present ruled out for obvious reasons. Let us assume that the Peace gives us a Central-African colonial Empire which corresponds, roughly speaking, with the territory which England was ready to concede to us in the negotiations of 1914—let us assume that, besides the recovery of our German colonies, we get as our future domain the whole of the Belgian Congo, the whole of French Equatorial Africa, and Angola.

What will the capabilities of this German Central-African empire be for defence? A glance at the map shows that the frontiers of our several colonies will be far less exposed. The danger in the case of the Cameroons, for instance, will be reduced by two-thirds, since the only frontier still needing to be defended will be that towards Nigeria; the whole French frontier will be eliminated. For German East Africa, the need to defend the western frontier will have gone; for German South-West Africa, the need to defend the northern frontier. We should indeed have a new frontier to defend in the old French Equatorial Africa, the northern Sahara frontier—no very hard task—and in the east there would be the frontier between ourselves and the Egyptian Sudan. But this latter frontier, again, is far from being exposed to the same danger as the French Cameroon frontier in former days, because the Egyptian Sudan is inhabited by fanatical Moslems, who could much more easily be stirred up to revolt by instigations from the German territory than induced to attack the territory of Germany, the friend and ally of the Khalif. German East Africa, it is true, would still have the frontier towards British East Africa to defend, and thus be still threatened from the north. The south of the Belgian Congo, the east of Angola, the east and south of German South-West Africa are conterminous with British territory. England therefore in this quarter, too, would be our chief enemy. If, however, one considers that German South-West Africa, with nothing but much-reduced colonial troops, which were intended (like the garrisons of our other colonies) only

to maintain internal order against native risings, held out for twelve months, and the Cameroons for seventeen months, whilst German East Africa is still, after twenty-six months, offering a brave resistance, it must be admitted that the English, if they undertook a campaign against this future Central-African Empire, would have a pretty difficult job, in order to gain even such successes as they have gained in German East Africa, supposing we had taken precautions beforehand to put the German colonial Empire in a proper state of defence. We should have no lack of man-power, none certainly of native man-power. The principal reason why German South-West Africa and the Cameroons had to give in was deficiency of munitions, the second reason was deficiency of foodstuffs. But our supply both of munitions and of foodstuffs could be rendered secure without difficulty, as the different parts of *Mittel-Afrika* were linked up by railways, so that the points of strategic importance might be occupied in the shortest possible time and the available foodstuffs transported from the places where they were produced to the places where they were needed. That this Central-African colonial Empire could produce sufficient foodstuffs for the white population—especially wheat, maize, rice, meat, etc.—cannot be doubted. In marking out the territories to be ceded to us particular account would, of course, be taken of the need to secure the strongest frontiers from the point of view of strategic defence. It would no doubt be easy to provide the colonial troops with arms and ammunition in the first instance, and also to equip adequate reinforcements in the event of war, from the rifles, machine-guns, guns and ammunition, which we have captured in the war. Our concern would principally be how to create an adequate reserve stock of munitions and how to make it possible to replace the munitions used up by new supplies in the colonies themselves, *i. e.*, the erection of munition-factories. Besides that, points of strategic importance would, of course, be fortified. The cool insolence with which the English penetrated into the unfortified harbour of Dar-es-Salaam, although they had been expressly prohibited from carrying out warlike operations there, has proved to us that the safety of our colonies will not be sufficiently guaranteed, unless we establish an adequate number of fortified naval bases. Besides that, we should have, of course, to keep ready at hand a squadron of fast cruisers of the necessary strength, as well as the other kinds of auxiliary vessels for defence—submarines, gunboats, mine-layers, etc.—all in sufficient numbers.

But how are we to find the money for all this? I hear

my readers ask. On this point, too, it is not difficult to see our way. All the African colonies have at present borrowed smaller or larger sums from their respective mother-countries for the construction of railways, harbours, etc. For instance, the Belgian Congo has borrowed about 100 million marks, French Equatorial Africa about 20 million marks, Angola about the same sum. We ought at the conclusion of peace to be able to insist that, in addition to the indemnities paid us in money, the colonies ceded to us should be given over absolutely free of debts and incumbrances. By this means we should have on the one hand the certainty of the ceded colonies paying their way, and on the other hand we might expect the annual revenue to yield such a surplus as would make it possible to raise a loan, immediately the colonies were handed over to the German Empire, for the purposes of defence. It ought to be easy to provide the interest on a defence-loan of from 50 to 100 million marks. For that sum of money a number of harbours might be fitted out as naval bases—*e. g.*, Dar-es-Salaam, the mouth of the German Cameroon estuary, the mouth of the Congo, a harbour on the coast of South-West Africa (perhaps Lüderitz Bay).

What results would follow from this erection of the German colonial harbours into *points d'appui* for the fleet? The whole coast of West Africa from the mouth of the Cross River to the mouth of the Orange River would be in German possession. If one remembers what great things were done by our *Emden* in the Indian Ocean, by the *Karlsruhe* in the Atlantic, without any naval base, without any possibility of replenishing their stores of munitions, foodstuffs and other kinds of equipment in any harbour, one begins to get some sort of idea what the fortification of half the Western coast of West Africa (*sic*) would mean for Germany and for England! As soon as the Suez Canal in another war is blocked against England by the Turks, the whole traffic between England and her colonies—India, Australia, and South Africa—will have to go round the Cape of Good Hope. But the whole maritime traffic round the Cape would then have to go past the coast of German *Mittel-Afrika*! What would the result be? It would be impossible for England any more to concentrate her whole fleet in the North Sea and threaten Germany. Far from that, England would be compelled to station a fairly large fleet in South Africa to safeguard her commerce. That would mean no inconsiderable weakening of the naval fighting forces in European waters.

The German colonies would not only [not] constitute a drag upon German sea-power—as is asserted by a good part of the German press—but would actually, as Dr. Solf, Secre-

tary of State for the Colonies, has already explained in his addresses, furnish German sea-power with a valuable support.\*

#### 7.—FREIHERR ALBRECHT VON RECHENBERG

Freiherr Albrecht von Rechenberg, known as a former Governor of German East Africa, contributed an article, entitled "*Kriegs- und Friedensziele*," to the monthly periodical *Nord und Süd* (February, 1917). In the course of it he discusses the question of German colonies:—

That the German Empire needs colonies has been so often shown, that it is unnecessary to go further into the reasons why—for the supply of raw materials, of the products of oversea countries, etc. All parties are agreed in this—that the German colonial empire cannot be abandoned. . . . It will be best to confine ourselves to the question what colonial territory we ought to desire and what territory it is possible for us to obtain.

A sufficient extent of land suitable for settlement is often stated to be the kind of colonial territory we should desire. This seems *prima facie* a sound proposition. The question, however, is whether such land is to be had. . . . Those regions which offer quite certainly the sum of conditions necessary for European colonization are already occupied by settled populations, which govern themselves and upon which we neither could impose, or want to impose, German supremacy.

And if, on the one hand, available land for settlement is lacking, we, on the other hand, equally lack suitable German settlers. The people who cry out that we should acquire large territories for settlement, are thinking of times gone by, when the German peasant-farmer, who was unable to support himself from his plot of ground, made up his mind to emigrate and found a scope for his activity, mainly in America, to the profit of his new country. Conditions have changed since then. For a number of years now emigration from Germany has been much more than counterbalanced by immigration into Germany. . . .

Regrettable as it is, the fact remains that at the future peace there can be no question of our acquiring wide lands

---

\* The end of the article seems to have been hurriedly written. The last sentence in German is nonsense as it stands, but the above rendering gives what is obviously its meaning.

for settlement: there is no suitable land and we have no agricultural population suitable to be settlers.

Of the other regions which come into consideration, we must rule out all such as it would be difficult or impossible for us to hold in days to come, either because the native population would eventually, as they developed, threaten the colony in virtue of their numbers or their degree of civilization, or because there were neighbouring Powers whose influence, in consequence of the local conditions, might jeopardize the existence of our colonies.

New acquisitions on the coast of China would fall into the first category. It goes without saying that the opening-up and development of China will continue to take its course after the war, and that European Powers will have to participate in that process, through the persons of their subjects, if they do not want to leave everything to the Japanese. But it is most certainly irrational to hold colonial possessions on Chinese territory, where they must be felt by the Chinese as an encroachment upon their soil and the embodiment of a foreign supremacy, while all the time instructors and directors of industry are bringing the military resources of China up to the European standard. If the instructors do their business, the first use to which the Chinese Empire will apply its new means of power is sure to be the freeing of its territory from foreign rule—that is to say, it will deprive the very people who sent it instructors of their colonies in China. Germany has already had bitter experience in this line. We may remember how much Japan owes to German military instructors, and we have seen in this war how Japan repays the debt. The experiment does not tempt one to repeat it.

Colonies in the South Pacific belong to the second category. The development of the Powers already established there will go forward. Australia, for instance, will grow stronger with the course of time—even if England has to relinquish her absolute command of the seas. Any colonies we might acquire in that region would be exposed to a menace which would grow greater, not less, with time.

The present war has taught us what characteristics our future colonial domain must have, in order that it may be maintained even in time of war. It must be sufficiently extensive to be able by its own inherent strength to defend the main part of its territory—at any rate defend it till such time as the war, which decides its destiny, has itself been decided in other fields, in fields where the decision will be brought about by our Army and our Navy.

The only German colony still maintaining itself against



enemies superior in numbers is German East Africa. Adjoining this is the Belgian Congo. On the supposition that Belgium—as we hope and as its population desires [!—is partitioned between France and Germany, the Belgian Congo and the French Congo, including the districts of Chad, Shari, and Wadai, would be attached to the German domain. Our domain would further be completed by the acquisition of British East Africa and Uganda, in exchange for which Kiao-chou, New Guinea, and our possessions in the South Seas would have to be given up. This compact colonial domain would offer within itself sufficient securities for defence and development. Togoland would be left isolated, and would, it is true, see its prospects of further development thus cut off. It would be worth considering whether it would not be well to cede Togoland to England in exchange for Northern Rhodesia and Nyassaland, since these British possessions are, even as it is, hemmed in by non-British territory. As for the Portuguese colonies, the treaty would have to be re-affirmed, which Germany and Great Britain at a former moment concluded with regard to them.

In this way Germany would have a colonial domain compact in itself, defensible and easily accessible on the West coast; the domain would offer an adequate field of activity to the German spirit of enterprise, and would thereby help to procure us the raw materials we lack—whether minerals or products of tropical agriculture. If by our administration we gain the sympathy of the natives, we can count upon them in the event of war—as has been seen in the case of East Africa. Our colonial domain would have such an extent that it would not be in the power of our enemies to conquer it, even if for a period the colonies were thrown upon their own resources. Again, such a colonial scheme would altogether correspond with the German programme—territorial expansion for the purpose of security only—and it would not impose upon our opponent any sacrifices which he would feel intolerable. That such a colonial domain would confront German colonial administration with new tasks can no more be questioned than that these tasks would often be difficult ones; yet they are not incapable of achievement, neither do they demand any excessive financial outlay, provided we resolve to adjust the measure of intensive administration to the amount of the resultant profit.

#### 8.—DAVIS TRIETSCH

Trietsch is the author of a pamphlet, published in 1917, entitled *Afrikanische Kriegsziele* (*African War-Aims*). We

may conjecture that, unlike the writers already cited, he is a Pan-German, since another of his small books, *Tatsachen und Ziffern*, is published by the Pan-German firm of Lehmann, and warmly recommended and circulated by Pan-Germans. Although the principal exponents of *Mittel-Afrika* deny that Germany needs the things for which the Pan-Germans clamour in Europe, there is no reason why Pan-Germans should not regard an African Empire as one of the things which would be thrown in, as a matter of course, if their European aims were realized. Trietsch writes:—

The nearer the peace negotiations seem to be, the more timely is it to get clear ideas, not only about possible or desirable changes of frontiers in Europe, but about the changes in territory overseas made necessary or attainable by the war. Discussions on this head have hitherto turned mainly upon the demand for a "*Mittel-Afrika*," as a parallel to the new *Mittel-Europa*. The joining-up of the most important German colonies—whether in their present shape or diminished or enlarged need not for the moment be discussed—by means of the intervening region, corresponding roughly with the present Belgian Congo State, would be a *sine qua non*. Then the immense Congo region, which little Belgium would be far too weak to develop properly, would be attached to that European colonial Power, which got far less than its rightful share in the partition of Africa. Then not only would Germany's principal colonies have gained a new territorial coherence, but their strategic situation and their facilities for communication from Ocean to Ocean would appear in quite a new light. Then a German *Mittel-Afrika* would enclose and round off the Mohammedan North, and help it to closer union with Turkey, the premier Power (*Vormacht*) of Islam, and with Turkey's political and military allies.

By this Germany's position in the world would gain in essential strength of a particular kind. Even before, Germany's strength consisted in its being a State economically and politically *compact*, strongly centred upon its main position, whereas the other colonial Powers, in the event of any conflict, could always be hard-hit by blows dealt on outlying parts, far from the main seat of their strength. This war has shown that for a Power in Germany's position the loss of its colonies is no decisive blow, whilst for England or

France it is unquestionable that grave unrest or disturbances in their subject oversea territories—or even their being threatened by Germany and her allies—would have changed the whole military situation of the mother-countries for the worse. . . .

In future wars Germany, if only by using the new military weapons acquired and perfected in this war, would be able to threaten England's colonial dominion to a far greater extent. The cruisings of the *Emden* off the coast of India have given an indication of the possibilities in this direction. Supposing Germany now, in rising to a new height of world-power, can succeed in rounding off and increasing its colonial territory, so changing a European compactness into a Europeo-African compactness, then the junction of *Mittel-Europa* with *Mittel-Afrika* by way of Turkey and Mohammedan North Africa would bring the third *Mittel* region, *i. e.*, the Mediterranean [in German *Mittelländische Meer*], to a degree one hardly could have hoped before, within the sphere of power of the group constituted by Germany and her allies. With a *compactness* extending now not only over one Continent, but *over a great part of the globe*, Germany could deal such blows to the world-wide interests and far-scattered colonies of her opponents, as would pre-eminently deter them from challenging her again.—(pp. 3-5.)

This author lays great stress upon the Mohammedan element in Africa as a factor which can be utilized to Germany's advantage:—

From whatever standpoint we regard the new world-situation created by the German-Turkish alliance, it is of the greatest possible consequence that Turkey, as the premier Power of the whole Moslem world, has an importance reaching far beyond the limits of its territory and its population. . . . The truth that religious connexions are more important in world-history than political is illustrated by the fact that most colonial ties carry in themselves from the outset the germ of their ultimate dissolution. The populations of colonies . . . are bound sooner or later to shake off the foreign yoke, and he whose patience can equal that of the religious communities is certain to win in the end.

These general considerations have especial applicability to Africa—the “most colonial” of the Continents! Africa can be regarded as consisting of three main divisions—the

Arabian or Arabianized North, including the Sudan, the black Central region, and the white Southern extremity. Of these three regions, the whole of the North and the northern part of the Centre may be regarded as already Mohammedan, and in addition a long strip of the coast stretching along the Indian Ocean southwards must be reckoned as belonging to Islam. The statistics and estimates—very defective, it is true, in the case of Africa—show the majority of the population as still heathen (according to Ritter, the total population is 150,000,000, out of which 80,000,000 are heathen, 60,000,000 Mohammedans, 9,600,000 Christians, and 400,000 Jews), but all agree that, whilst heathenism is receding, the gain falls in far greater measure to Islam than to Christianity. . . . The gains of Christian missions are estimated at the most as so many tens of thousands a year, whilst the annual increase of the Mohammedan community is to be reckoned by millions. This was the state of the case even when Islam as a political Power seemed to be on the decline. How much more vigorous and rapid will the expansion of Islam in heathen Africa be, now that its premier Power, Turkey, has got itself included in the most mighty group of states in the world and has made victorious head against all its foes on all fronts! The result ought to be that we can even to-day look forward to an Africa nine-tenths Mohammedan, and it will be one of Germany's most important tasks in Africa to further energetically her political predominance alongside of the growing influence of Islam. No other means so effectual present themselves to stem the encroachments of England and France upon the Mohammedan domain in Africa. But if this policy is successful, then we have an altogether new world-situation with the most extraordinary prospects!—(pp. 10-12.)

Trietsch sums up in conclusion the *Mittel-Afrika* scheme :—

To found a big colonial Empire in Africa, reaching from the South-West to the South-East [*sic*, misprint for North-East?] and up as far as the Cameroons and Togo, bound into one by regions which were once French, Belgian, or (it may be) British—that must be our aim. It is a necessity for our independence in the matter of the supply of raw materials; it is no less so for our position on the seas. Such a realm, properly organized, would be self-maintaining, and could be administered somewhat after the pattern of the British "Dominions." The pawns, which ought to bring it to us, we hold in Northern France and in Belgium. . . . We might almost say that this factor in the terms of peace would

offer the strongest evidence that we were unconquerable.—  
(pp. 30-31.)

#### 9.—EMIL ZIMMERMANN

During the last two years Emil Zimmermann has become the most industrious preacher of the *Mittel-Afrika* gospel. Articles from his pen on the subject have appeared in *Das grössere Deutschland*, the Pan-German weekly; in Rohrbach's weekly, *Deutsche Politik*; in the Liberal weekly, the *Europäische Staats- und Wirtschafts-Zeitung*; and especially in the *Preussische Jahrbücher*—to say nothing of articles contributed to the daily press.

He himself wandered about a good deal in Africa before the war, through the rich tropical region upon which he now casts rapacious eyes. In 1910 he went through Rhodesia into the Congo State and from the Congo State into German East Africa. In 1912 he made a journey through the Cameroons, and together with Frau Zimmermann visited the French and the Belgian Congo. In 1913 he went right across the Continent from the mouth of the Congo to Dar-es-Salaam.\*

Zimmermann's articles repeat, but with significant elaborations, all the stock arguments, which we have found brought forward by other writers—the need of Germany to have a secure supply of tropical raw materials from its own territory, the value of *Mittel-Afrika*, as supplying military and naval bases from which the bands of the British Empire

---

\* An account of these journeys will be found in the *Preussische Jahrbücher* for December, 1916, and January, 1917. Emil Zimmermann is not to be confounded with Alfred Zimmermann, who was a colonial attaché in the Foreign Office service, and has written a standard history of modern European colonization; nor with Arthur Zimmermann, the late German Secretary for Foreign Affairs; nor with Eugene Zimmermann, Director of the Scherl publishing firm and leading man on the *Berliner Local-Anzeiger*; nor with Adolf Zimmermann, the war correspondent.

could be broken up, whenever Germany chose. On the latter topic he enlarges with edifying freedom:—

For our present unfavourable position in the Far East England—apart from Japan—is chiefly responsible; the principal opponent of our expansion in the Pacific is Australia. But we shall never be able to exercise pressure upon Australia from a base in the South Seas; we might very well do so from East Africa. Australia needs for its exports (minerals, wool, meat, tallow, butter, cheese, wheat) an open road through the Indian Ocean. This road can be gravely menaced from East Africa. It is true Australian commerce might take the route round the Cape; but even on this route merchant ships would hardly be safe against attacks directed from East Africa. The policy therefore both of Australia and of India might be very strongly influenced by pressure from German *Mittel-Afrika*, and British policy, too, since England has as strong an interest in unimpeded commercial intercourse with India and Australia as India and Australia have in unimpeded intercourse with England.

If we have a position of strength in *Mittel-Afrika*, with which India and Australia must reckon, then we can compel both of them to respect our wishes in the South Seas and in Eastern Asia, and we thereby drive the first wedge into the compact front of our opponents in Eastern Asia.

We are confronted in Africa, too, with a multitude of enemies, but we can diminish their number by compelling them to cede great bits of Africa to us and to our allies. Besides that, we do not stand alone in the Black Continent. In the North-African Mohammedan we have a faithful ally, who in the present war has given notable proofs of his courage and bravery. By a well-directed policy we could attach the Mohammedans of Africa permanently to our side.

It is therefore a comparatively easy matter to create a strong position for German power in *Mittel-Afrika*—(*Europäische Staats- und Wirtschafts-Zeitung*, June 23, 1917, p. 631.)

Zimmermann argues against those who proclaim that, if Germany has a strong position in Europe, that is *enough*:—

A Germany weak at home would, of course, not have any prestige abroad. But if one thing is certain, it is that the strongest position at home would not suffice by itself. Japan, for instance, is unassailable in Eastern Asia; but Japan can hardly be called a World-Power. Its influence is quite small even in a region so near to it as the Indian Ocean. A very

strong Germany, commanding the North Sea, would no doubt be able to prevent England from again closing the English Channel to it; it would have a free sea. But what would a free sea profit it against the antagonism of America and Japan, against the hostility of South Africa and Australia? . . .

The Great War determines the evolution of mankind for the next hundred years. If it makes Central Africa German, then fifty years hence it may well be that beside fifty millions of blacks there will be living 500,000 and more Germans. Then perhaps in German Africa an army of a million men will be ready to march, and the colony will have its own war-fleet, like Brazil. It will be a valuable ally for South America against North-American aggression; the United States, too, will have to reckon with a country so powerful. With this country, well-developed and well-furnished, as a basis, we shall have been able in the meantime to develop a stronger position in the South Seas as well. . . . It would be a mistake to make England strong in Africa in return for British promises to back us up in the Far East. An England strong in Africa commands the situation in South Europe, and could get on without us. But from Central Africa we should command the British connexions with South Africa, with India and with Australia, and compel British policy to take account of us. The United States could not permanently thwart our interests in Eastern Asia and the South Seas, if a strong German *Mittel-Afrika* made its influence felt upon developments in South America. . . .—(pp. 631-633.)

With regard to *Mittel-Europa*-plus-Turkey, the scheme to which many "Moderates" attach the first importance, Zimmermann, the spokesman of the *Mittel-Afrika* school, takes the line that though, in combination with *Mittel-Afrika*, *Mittel-Europa* would be valuable, apart from *Mittel-Afrika*, it would profit Germany little. In the first place, the riches to be got out of the Turkish Empire, he argues, are not really as great as the more fervent enthusiasts for "Berlin-to-Bagdad" imagine:—

I have never fallen into the error of over-estimating the potentialities of Nearer Asia. Mesopotamia, in particular, with its scanty population of a little over a million to 184,000 square kilometres, never seemed to me the Promised Land which within a calculable time could even approximately supply our demand for wool and vegetable oils. It is only under

British rule, supposing that Britain throws some five or six million Indians into the country and expends great sums in developing it, that Mesopotamia might within a generation become something like Egypt. Turkey could not develop it. Nor have we the kind of man-power at our disposal necessary for the achievement of such a task.—(*Preussische Jahrbücher*, February, 1917, p. 329.)

Zimmermann goes on to appeal to German geographical authorities and to the reports of Sir William Willcocks, to prove that the stories of the astonishing wealth of ancient Babylonia are greatly exaggerated. On the basis of Willcocks's plans, one may calculate that the area probably cultivated in antiquity, 30,000 square kilometres—the maximum which the available volume of water would irrigate—would take twenty-four years to reclaim and cost 1,200,000,000 marks (£60,000,000).

In the second place, Zimmermann argues, without a German *Mittel-Afrika* to protect its flank, a German Turkey could not defend itself:—

German East Africa, whose magnificent resistance has had far-reaching effects upon the whole of African Mohammedanism, has shown itself to be the real rampart of Nearer Asia. The whole truth will not come out till after the war; but even to-day we can reckon approximately what an immense volume of force our East-African colonial troops, in alliance with the Mohammedan peoples, have diverted to Africa. If it was the object of the British (and Russians), as is now proved, to break up Turkey-in-Asia, it was needful that North Africa should be absolutely tranquil before any attack on Syria and Palestine from the Suez Canal could take place.—(*Preussische Jahrbücher*, May, 1917, p. 315.)

It is not too much to say that Africa has saved Turkey-in-Asia. And if Turkey now desires, no less than we ourselves do, a durable peace, which may guarantee it a long period of quiet work, we cannot fail to see that the restoration of the *status quo ante* in Africa is absolutely the *minimum* condition. Without adequate flank protection in Africa Asiatic Turkey cannot survive. *Without this protection all the money which we have advanced to Turkey during the war will be lost.* [The last sentence in spaced type in the original.]—(p. 317.)



One cannot see how *Mittel-Europa* by itself would be the step forwards which our own evolution and the course of the world before the war make it incumbent upon us to take. The end in view was clear: to supplement our domestic resources by a great productive economic field in the tropics which was our very own. And *Mittel-Europa* has a value only if it helps us to attain this end by making it easier for us to hold fast our tropical dependencies in future world-storms. We shall never be able to render unselfish (*sic*) service to Bulgaria and the Turkish Empire unless these countries form a bridge to a tropical region of economic value, binding that region to us by connexions which it would be impossible for England to break. (As for the "freedom of the seas," that is not worth the drop of ink used to write the phrase). . . . —(*Das grössere Deutschland*, July 22, 1916.)

The most important decisions of the Great War have taken place in the East. In that direction we have attained almost the whole of our aims—the enlargement of *Mittel-Europa*, the clearing of all Russian influence out of the Balkans, the securing of our connexions with Turkey, with the Turkish and Arab world. But Islam is powerful in Africa as well; it constitutes the bridge to our chief colonies, the Cameroons and German East Africa, which have stood like stubborn corner-pillars in the world-storm. Clearer and ever clearer the great thought stands out: *Mittel-Europa and Mittel-Afrika with the Turkish and Arab world as the connecting bridge between them*. . . .

It was a great mistake that the old lines of communication between Central Europe and the Orient were allowed to pass completely out of use and oceanic navigation came to dominate men's minds exclusively. This changed the Mediterranean, which, till the end of the Middle Ages, had been the connecting road between Europe, the Near East, and North Africa, into a barrier of separation. Certainly the weakness and the internal divisions of Central Europe, which prevented any effective influence upon the destinies of North Africa, were partly responsible; and this rich land fell into decay.

When a strong *Mittel-Europa* and a promising *Mittel-Afrika* are there, the Mediterranean can no longer be under the predominant influence of the Western Powers; then North Africa is bound to rise rapidly in importance. For *Mittel-Europa* the way to Lake Chad and the interior of Africa goes across the Mediterranean Sea and through Tripoli. We are always talking about the great Berlin-Constantinople-Basra route; but we ought to bear in mind that the line from Berlin to Lake Chad through Tripoli is not any longer. From Berlin, again, the way through Vienna, Ragusa, and

Benghazi in North Africa to the north end of Lake Tanganyika is no longer than the way from Moscow to Lake Baikal.

If to-day anyone says in Berlin: "I am off on a journey to Lake Tanganyika!" he is looked upon as a curiosity, so immensely far away to ordinary German thinking is the lake in the interior of Africa. But in Russia a journey from Petersburg to Irkutsk on Lake Baikal does not presumably appear anything extraordinary. It takes from six to seven days.

To-day the interior of Africa, even the comparatively near Sudan, seems to us so remote because we are accustomed to have our gaze riveted on the sea, to make long sea-voyages to the African coast and thence penetrate into the interior; the consciousness that a shorter way exists, a way already much frequented in grey antiquity, we have lost. But, when we have once secured a flourishing *Mittel-Afrika*, the consciousness might revive. Why not?

It seems to me that history will lead us by another way than that which for decades past has been in the mind of our German politicians. We shall not go by the Bagdad railway to the Far East, in order to seek there the foundation for a Greater Germany; we shall find the foundation for it in *Mittel-Afrika* and in its connexion with the Arab and Turkish world. . . .

If, fifty years hence, German *Mittel-Afrika* contains, together with fifty million negroes, five hundred thousand Germans, if great cities with a rich life have grown up on Lake Chad, on the Congo, on Lake Tanganyika, then it will no longer be anything strange for a Berlin mercantile firm to give orders to its traveller at the beginning of September: "Pack up your box of samples, take the Congo express, and attend the autumn fair at Wilhelmstadt" (as Stanleyville will then be called); "we shall expect to receive your orders in three to four weeks. There will then be time to execute them so that the goods may be delivered at their destination in Africa by the beginning of December"!

It will be a seven days' journey from Berlin to the Congo or to Lake Tanganyika. Express traffic will go across the Mediterranean and North Africa; sea-borne traffic will go from the ports on the North Sea by ship along the old sea-routes. A new flourishing world will have grown up round the Mediterranean. . . .—(*Preussische Jahrbücher*, February, 1917, pp. 335-337.)

Zimmermann notices in one place the proposal made in England that, instead of Germany being given back her

African colonies, all "colonial territory all over the world should be internationalized." This proposal has, one gathers, been supported by Sir Harry Johnston in the interests of the black races. Zimmermann is very angry with Sir Harry:—

It is mere dishonesty and low-down hypocrisy (*niederträchtige Heuchelei*) when to-day Sir Johnston raises his voice for the liberation of the Hottentots, Ovambo and Bantu negroes from German rule. And when one reads the wilderness of lies, hypocrisies, distortions, and utter misunderstanding of the actual situation, which English and American statesmen exhibit in speech and writing, one is almost driven to despair of such people having any capacity left to recognize the vital needs of their own countries, let alone those of enemy countries.—(*Europäische Staats- und Wirtschafts-Zeitung*, October 6, 1917, p. 948.)

With regard to the internationalization of Central Africa:—

Sir Harry Johnston and his set must not expect that in Germany one single person in his senses (*auch nur ein vernünftige Mensch*) will entertain such a notion. As for the permission to work alongside of others in Central Africa—no thank you (*bedanken wir uns bestens*). As things now are, neither an internationalization of all colonial territories nor the famous "freedom of the seas" are likely to help us much.

One argument Zimmermann uses, in order to intimidate Great Britain and America by the prospect of the consequences for themselves, if they prevent the creation of *Mittel-Afrika*:—

Suppose the Anglo-Saxons succeeded in blocking our way to oversea possessions, the result would be that a process would begin in Europe, which would make *Mittel-Europa* find its future America in the East, the South-East and Nearer Asia. America would then lose the greater part of its immigrants and forfeit an enormous part of its power of resistance to the yellow race. Very soon the American West would become a field for yellow colonization. . . .

Nothing worse could happen to Australia, South Africa and America than the exclusion of Central-European man

from oversea regions.—(*Europäische Staats- und Wirtschafts-Zeitung*, October 6, 1917, p. 948.)

Since Zimmermann has already explained that if *Mittel-Afrika* does come about, it will have the trade communications of Australia and South Africa at its mercy, the prospect for these countries would seem pretty gloomy either way! They might not impossibly prefer to risk the consequences of *Mittel-Afrika's* being prevented. The same may be said of the United States, since Zimmermann has indicated that one of the advantages of *Mittel-Afrika* is that it will be able to drive North-American influence out of South America. This point, indicated in an article already quoted, he developed at large in later articles, and in this book:—

The interests of South America, especially of the so-called A.B.C. States [Argentina, Brazil, Chile], are by no means identical with those of the United States.

South America can only develop vigorously if it continues to draw to itself a strong stream of immigration; Brazil and Argentina especially are making great efforts to attract men. They are in this way strong rivals of the United States, which, without the regular influx of immigrants, cannot keep up the rapid rate of their development. For the last three years the stream of immigration into America has almost run dry; even the United States are hungry for men. They will try their hardest to draw to themselves in the near future the peoples now allied to them—Italians, Serbs, Belgians—so that not many will be left over for South America. All the more welcome will it be to states like Brazil and Argentina, if they are able to get men by our means, and we ought to commence an agitation on the grand scale after the war for inducing the North-American Germans to emigrate—so far as they do not betake themselves to the new German colonial Empire—to South America. We must do this on condition that the South Americans adopt a policy favourable to us in the matter of raw materials. . . .

For the Anglo-Saxons cannot keep South America permanently within their sphere of influence, because the interests of the two sides are too divergent, and we have it in our power to accentuate considerably the antagonism between North and South America after the war by directing the stream of German emigration on a definite plan.

The aim of a far-seeing policy must accordingly be to turn systematically to account, as required by world-wide German economic and political interests, the unrest which, after the conclusion of peace, will seize great multitudes of the Germans abroad—in Australia, South Africa, North America, Russia—and so prevent our enemies' obtaining advantage over us in getting control of the cheap fields of supply. The Anglo-Saxon world is systematically working, as its straining after China and South America shows, to bar our access to the cheap fields of supply, either by bringing about an agreement which will allow us only to purchase raw materials at increased rates or by compelling all the states which adhere to the Anglo-Saxon *bloc* to sell raw materials, tropical foodstuffs and tropical luxuries to Germany by way of English or North-American ports exclusively. . . .

The most important condition in our peace-terms must be the breaking up of this World-Syndicate for the supply of raw materials. . . .

*The foundation for an independent German world-wide economic system can only be a territory of our own among the cheap fields of supply, a big German colonial Empire, and, as things are, the main part of this Empire must be situated in Central Africa.*—(*Preussische Jahrbücher*, July, 1917, pp. 135-138.)

The idea of a German *Mittel-Afrika* is so important, not because Central Africa would be able immediately to deliver us any considerable quantity of raw materials, but because it gives occasion to the sifting of spirits in foreign countries as well. The Anglo-Saxon opposition will lose strength as soon as the Anglo-Saxons realize that our purpose is not to press them hard in their own colonial territories; and, above all else, a deep cleavage will immediately come to exist between North and South and Central America. . . .

The interests of these countries are by no means in accord. Especially they stand as rivals to each other in the struggle to attract immigrants. . . . We have it in our power to intervene energetically in favour of South America. We and our allies must—always supposing that Central and South America pursue a policy favourable to us in the matter of raw materials—turn to full account the great unrest which has seized our kinsmen in North America and the Germans in South Africa and Australia, by influencing the migration of Germans, Austrians, Hungarians, Bulgarians and Turks overseas. They must be urged to go to South and Central America, except in so far as they are disposed to betake themselves to Germany or the German colonies or the countries allied with us. By this means we shall draw the Central and South American States into our alliance and

break their connection with the Anglo-Saxons, with whom they have practically no economic interests in common. The principal Anglo-Saxon Powers, possessing as they do themselves large territories which supply raw materials, have no interest in the development of Central and South America. These States, on the other hand, and the Empires of Central Europe supplement each other admirably.

The combination *Mittel-Europa*, Nearer Asia, *Mittel-Afrika*, Central and South America—that is what we must strive to bring about.—(*Preussische Jahrbücher*, August, 1917, pp. 294-295.)

To the November number of the *Preussische Jahrbücher* last year (1917) Emil Zimmermann contributes an article pitched in quite a different key. The variation is not without its humorous quality. We have seen him in former articles display, with exultation, how *Mittel-Afrika* would give Germany an unassailable position from which it could, whenever it chose, break up the bands of the British Commonwealth, dominate the Mediterranean and the Near East, and strengthen South America against North America. Then suddenly he discovers that one of his recent articles has been read with interest over the frontiers. A leading article in *The Times* of September 3, 1917, had quoted from his article in the August number of the *Preussische Jahrbücher*, and had seemed to detect in it a certain unfriendly intention. Instantly Zimmermann becomes the inoffensive, peaceful, misjudged, oppressed German. *Mittel-Afrika* is no longer an armed and menacing fortress, but a paradise of quiet work and pastoral refreshment.

It is all very well (so we are given to understand) to accuse the Germans of greed because they want to get possession of the Congo State, but if the Germans do not take it, it is likely to be seized by another Power—Great Britain or the United States!

When in the year 1913 I was travelling in the Belgian Congo, I came across English agents everywhere, and the

American missions were so numerous and had such abundant means at their disposal, that they were able to have their own big river-steamers. On the steamer which carried me from Europe to the mouth of the Congo, an American missionary was one of my fellow-travellers, and he had travelling with him a simple sort of a man, one Mr. Hillhouse. "An artizan attached to the Mission" (*Missionshandwerker*), the missionary described him to me. Information as to this so-called "artizan" was given to the Belgian Chamber by the Minister for the Colonies, Renkin, on March 11, 1914. An agriculturist (*Landwirt*) from Kentucky, he stated, named Hillhouse, had, by the instrumentality of the Presbyterian Mission at Kasai, started the cultivation of fruit trees, cotton and sugar-cane, and live-stock farming, and he intended to induce a number of married farmers from Kentucky to join him.

So already in 1913 the United States were beginning, through the agency of the Presbyterian Mission, to colonize the Belgian Congo with American farmers! Now let us suppose Germany fails to get possession of the Belgian Congo. In that case, Belgium itself is done with (*auch erledigt*), because Germany will in that case refuse to give it up. Then the Belgian Congo is without an owner. Of course, England will then lay claim to it. Or can it be that Herr Wilson has his eye on it?

*I ask the Latin Republics of South and Central America, I ask the Brazilians, what their future is likely to be, if the English dominate the whole of South and Central America, or if Mittel-Afrika becomes a colony of the United States?*

... ..  
The feelings which came to me on the wide steppes of Central Africa must awake in thousands of German hearts, and the thousand soul-forces in the German must find full scope in the broad free New Germany, and beget a new spirit in a new generation, steeped in the feeling of large spaces—a spirit which will react fruitfully upon the old Germany.

Of course, this new German stock must not be allowed to wither away again. It must be able to grow in quiet and in peace. For that reason *Mittel-Afrika* must be strong. . . . It is wretched nonsense, when *The Times* talks as if this idea of *Mittel-Afrika* were suggested by a policy of Power (*Machtpolitik*), "whatever may be the garb it wears for the moment." . . .

*The Times* cannot understand that there are hearts beating in Germany, whose dream is a great New Germany, the land of freedom over the seas, the Garden of Eden that beckons to all that is German all over the earth, all that travails and is heavy-laden, whose spirit has been broken in

this unhappy world-catastrophe by the persecuting rage of the English and the North-Americans.

*In a great German Mittel-Afrika, where a thousand tasks wait for accomplishment, there can be no room for thoughts of conquest and world-dominion. . . .* —(*Preussische Jahrbücher*, November, 1917, pp. 293-299.)

This alternation in Emil Zimmermann between schemes of far-reaching mastery and the mood of self-pity and injured innocence is something which those who study the recent literature of German *Weltpolitik* are likely to recognize as familiar. It is characteristic of the emotional German, who is disposed always to look at himself in a melodramatic light—either as trampling down the earth like the invincible hero of a saga, or as a pathetic figure of simple honesty ill-used by a malignant world. It probably does not in most cases denote any conscious duplicity. Only it is astonishing to outsiders. Anyone, for instance who having read the last sentence quoted from Zimmermann's November article in the *Preussische Jahrbücher* turns back to read the article which he contributed in June to the *Europäische Staats- und Wirtschafts-Zeitung*, and from which extracts are given above on pages xxxiii—xxxv, is likely to find the comparison sufficiently remarkable.

#### 10.—DR. WILHELM SOLF

The German Government is, of course, not bound by the statements of any of the writers we have passed in review; the writers are all unofficial, although some of them are men of high standing and influence, as writers on public affairs, in Germany. It is, therefore, important to see how far the *Mittel-Afrika* scheme is endorsed by the German Government. The authoritative exponent of the views of the Government is Dr. Wilhelm Solf, Secretary of State for the Colonies. Dr. Solf is himself a scholar, whose studies earlier



in life lay in the field of Sanskrit and Indian languages. After holding an official post for some time in Calcutta, he was appointed Governor of German Samoa in 1900, and has first-hand experience of colonial administration.

Dr. Solf has made various speeches during the war which may be taken as revealing the mind of the Government. So far as his manner goes, he is strikingly temperate and reasonable, and only passes into polemical asperity, where he is concerned to rebut English allegations. "The underlying tone of my address can be only deep indignation and fierce anger at the latest pronouncements of British statesmen," he said, when speaking at Leipzig in June, 1917.

When we examine the substance of Dr. Solf's utterances, they cannot be construed in any sense except one which endorses the *Mittel-Afrika* plan. He seems to avoid using the term *Mittel-Afrika*; he does not specify circumstantially, as the unofficial writers do, the regions which must be taken to form the new German African Empire. But he advances the same propositions, which the unofficial writers put forward as proving the necessity of their *Mittel-Afrika*; he lays down their premises, and it is therefore natural to suppose that he draws, if he does not enunciate, their conclusion.

In the first place, Dr. Solf is quite clear that when people on our side talk about "giving back" Germany her colonies, meaning the restoration of the territorial frontiers in Africa as they were before the war, they are talking nonsense. Germany, he says emphatically, can never be satisfied with the territorial partition which existed before the war. Africa must be re-divided up and portions allotted according to the size of the mother-countries and the amount of territory they have already elsewhere. On this principle, Germany would get a great deal more, and Belgium and Great Britain a great deal less.

Gentlemen, the position of Africa has changed astonishingly during the last decades both from the political, and from the economic, point of view. Africa is no longer the Black Continent, no longer the unexplored world with a bewildering multitude of dark possibilities. To-day it is a foreland of Europe, with appreciable present values. Africa will play a part of rapidly growing significance in the evolution of the globe. The increasing demand for raw materials, and before long the anxiety to find a market for manufactured articles, will lead to an intenser competition, in order to tap the African sources of supply. The existing partition of Africa amongst the European colonizing states is the result of a comparatively recent development, in which, alongside of antiquated pretensions to sovereignty, more or less accidental events have been the determining factors. . . . There has been no question of an organic process. No wonder that the present partition should to a large extent lack any inherent justification! We see states in possession of gigantic areas, eighty times the size of the mother-country, which they are incapable of developing from a deficiency of men and means—at any rate incapable of developing, as civilized mankind requires. This applies to Belgium, France and Portugal. Great Britain, which has already incorporated in its Empire immense tracts in other continents, has known how to secure for itself an important share of Africa, a share approaching that of France. On the other hand, we Germans see ourselves confined to territories which are considerably smaller and which are far-scattered. He who desires a durable peace, a peace of just contentment, cannot wish the present partition of territory in Africa to be maintained, since it in no wise corresponds either with the colonizing capabilities or with the relative strength of the nations concerned.—(Address to the German Colonial Society in Berlin on December 21, 1917, reprinted in *Deutsche Politik* for December 28, 1917.)

As for the suggestion of “internationalization,” Dr. Solf expresses himself as follows:—

The idea of a complete internationalization of the tropical regions with a joint administration by the European protecting states is propagated by certain philanthropic circles in England. The most emphatic opponents of such an internationalization are likely to arise in England itself. But, quite apart from that, an organization of this kind would be feasible, only if it were supported by a feeling of solidarity in the European states. Such a feeling of solidarity will no doubt arise in the form of an aspiration out of the ruins of this war, indeed, be established as a fundamental demand of

the new spirit in international compacts; but before one can lay such a stupendous task as that of ruling oversea territories in harmonious co-operation upon the belligerents of to-day—one might say, upon the whole of Europe, as it is to-day—the international consciousness will have to have been developed and confirmed in Europe by the actual practice of international dealings. We must therefore hold fast to the principle which has hitherto prevailed in colonization—a *partition* of the tropical countries amongst the civilized European states. In the treaty of peace there can only be the question of a *fresh partition*.

Germany must have her colonial Empire, Dr. Solf insists, not because she needs a field for emigration—she has no surplus population—but because she needs raw materials:—

We—I mean ourselves and all the European states—are not likely to have any superfluity of enterprising young men to settle in Africa—quite apart from the question, still undecided, how far Africa is colonizable by Mediterranean man. But exhausted Europe will have an immense hunger for the products of the tropics.

Again, Dr. Solf lays stress, just as the unofficial exponents of *Mittel-Afrika* do, upon the necessity of a *continuous* empire instead of the former detached territories and upon the possibility of making a continuous area practically unassailable if it is *large* enough:—

Have not our colonies, with such military resources as they had, displayed a resistance of which we may well be proud, and that under the most unfavourable conditions conceivable? Have not the Cameroons and German South-West Africa been occupied by the enemy for no other reason than that the war has been protracted beyond every expectation? Is not German East Africa holding out even to-day against superior forces assailing it from all sides? In view of these facts, we have every right to hope that we shall make our dependencies secure against all possible attacks in the future, if we lay to heart the lessons of the war. Just as the war has shown that the solid block of *Mittel-Europa* is a match for any military coalition, so the war has taught us that in the tropics, too, *the power of military resistance and the capacity for self-maintenance is*

*in direct proportion to the size of the continuous area.* Just as at home we make it a leading consideration to shape our future frontiers in such a way that we need no longer fear any hostile attack, so we shall have to bear this consideration in mind when we re-shape our colonial possessions.

If at the conclusion of peace we can draw the frontiers of our colonies in such a way that we acquire compact territories, less exposed to attack from many sides, if we turn to account the experiences of naval warfare gained in these years in order to safeguard our oversea possessions, no less than the home-lands, and make their coasts strong for defence, if we elaborate a legal system upon which a closer organization of the white population can be based, if we raise the numbers of the troops, white and coloured, maintained on a peace-footing (*erhöhen wir die Friedensstärke der weissen und farbigen Truppen*), if we institute a well-thought-out system of supplies, with great stores of arms, ammunition, clothing and miscellaneous articles of equipment, as well as of foodstuffs and medical requirements, if we develop communications of all kinds within the colonies and wireless connexions with the home-country, then we need not in any future war look forward to the certainty of losing our colonies over again, but rather to the possibility, at worst, of a temporary separation.—(Speech made in the summer of 1916, reprinted under the title of *Die Lehren des Weltkrieges für unsere Kolonialpolitik*, in Jäckh's series *Der deutsche Krieg*.)

Dr. Solf further agrees with the exponents of *Mittel-Afrika* in seeing the future German African Empire as a means for increasing Germany's power on the globe, and he indicates, as they do, how valuable its harbours might be, if turned into naval bases:—

The motive which prompted us in the first instance to acquire our colonies was not the desire for power. But during the war various facts have emerged, which make the continuance and elaboration of a colonial policy a necessity for us even from the consideration of power. In this connexion I will only indicate, as a question of prime importance, the creation of naval bases. The inestimable value which such bases would have for German sea-power was generally recognized even before the war. But to discuss that matter lies outside my official province.—(*Die Lehren des Weltkrieges*, p. 19.)

What is all this except to adopt the *Mittel-Afrika* scheme in all its essentials, even in those most calculated to alarm British statesmen?

The German Government is evidently determined to come to the Peace Congress well equipped with the fullest data as to Central Africa. We read in the *Sozialistische Monatshefte* (February 5, 1918):—

Paul Sprigade and Max Moisel, the expert map-makers, have begun, by command of the Imperial Colonial Office, to elaborate a new series of sheets covering *Mittel-Afrika*. Of this imposing work, on the scale of 1: 2,000,000, the two sheets covering the Eastern Sudan have now been issued by Dietrich Reimer in Berlin. They are admirable in every respect. With the most conscientious thoroughness they have laid every accessible source under contribution—especially the official French, British, German and Belgian maps, as well as the publications of unofficial investigators, and may well bring the knowledge of these regions a good step forwards. . . . At the coming peace negotiations the geography of *Mittel-Afrika* will play a principal part.

## II.—“DEUTSCHE WELTPOLITIK UND KEIN KRIEG”

The utterances of Dr. Solf would by themselves suffice to prove that the scheme of *Mittel-Afrika* is not merely the dream of a group of private individuals, but a project which has behind it the deliberate will of the German Government. Such a conclusion is confirmed by further evidence. From this we may gather that the scheme was not first adopted by the German Government in the heat of the world-war, but represents a purpose of old standing. It was in pursuance of such a purpose that the German Government before the war had entered upon negotiations with the British Government, which had almost succeeded in getting the British Government to agree to arrangements calculated to bring German *Mittel-Afrika* about, automatically as it were, in process of time. For in those days there was a very general disposition

among British statesmen to give all reasonable gratification to the German desire for a place among the colonizing Powers. Dr. Solf alluded to these transactions in his Leipzig speech of June, 1917:—

In the time before the war, clearly recognizing the importance of *continuous colonial territories* for the safety of the German nation, we had made far-reaching preparations, in order that by peaceful understanding and agreement we might shape our colonial possessions in a way corresponding to the most urgent colonial necessities. . . .”

For a long time it has been an open secret, even in England, that even before the war we had plans for *making a united whole* of our African possessions by means of peaceful arrangements.

In this connexion, especial interest attaches now to a little book which appeared in 1913, to expound this very policy, and which was entitled *Deutsche Weltpolitik und kein Krieg* (*German World-Policy and No War*). The importance of this book is that it is declared by common report in Germany to have emanated from the German Embassy in London. It is even attributed by many to Kühlmann himself. Whether he actually wrote it seems doubtful, but there is no reason to doubt that in its main purport it reflects his views. We may infer that the scheme of *Mittel-Afrika*, as presented in 1917, largely coincides with the project which was favoured in 1913 by the man who is now Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the German Empire.

The Pan-German writer, Count Reventlow, recognized in 1916, when Dr. Solf began to lecture on Germany's colonial aims, that his programme practically resumed that of the well-known anonymous pamphlet (*Deutsche Tageszeitung*, May 20, 1916).

When the pamphlet was written, it would not have been possible to represent the immediate acquisition of the Belgian

and Portuguese territories in Africa as a policy essentially pacific. The author's proposal was that Germany should in the first instance penetrate these regions economically on a friendly understanding with the Belgians and the Portuguese.

No man of intelligence can suppose that we would wish to despoil Belgium and Portugal of their colonial possessions. But it is undeniable that neither Portugal nor Belgium has the requisite means and resources for properly developing its African possessions in an economic sense. . . . Since Portugal is thus reduced to require the collaboration of foreign nations in order to make anything of its colonies, the question is, What nation is to be the one to collaborate? In our opinion Germany has the most legitimate claims and the most favourable prospects. . . . Now if we were to employ a considerable proportion of our economic energy—with the consent, of course, of the Portuguese Government—in developing the Portuguese colonies, it would be on the supposition that this labour was not to be lost to our nation, as the work of German culture in the United States and in South America is lost. In the event of Portugal's coming later on to the conclusion that it would be profitable for it to dispose of its colonies, we should need to have secured to us a first claim upon them. For this an understanding with the other European Powers is even more necessary for us than an understanding with Portugal. But we have no reason to expect that England would oppose such claims on the part of Germany. As we have already pointed out more than once, Sir Edward Grey declared in his speech in Parliament of November 27, 1911, that England did not regard Central Africa as belonging to her sphere of interest. . . . We have every right to count upon England's good will. . . .

Next to the political considerations, we must look at the strategical ones which would bear upon the question of a colonial enterprise in Central Africa. We have emphasized that, so far as we can see, we ought not to contemplate a direct acquisition of territory in Central Africa in the near future. But since Portugal would be quite incapable of defending its possessions against the attack of a Great Power, the case might occur of our having to defend the economic interests we had created—all the more, since at a more distant future the possibility of a formal acquisition might present itself. . . .

There is no strong military Power in Central Africa; indeed, no territorial Power at all, which might become a danger to us. In the neighbouring foreign colonies only relatively small colonial forces are stationed, which could never act effectively over such immense areas. The militia of the South African Union constitute indeed an excellent force for the defence of the country itself, but would not lend themselves in anything like the same degree to purposes of attack or conquest. We should be absolutely safe against attacks from European Powers by land. As for attacks by sea, the strongest enemy fleet could as little conquer an African colony as an African colonial force could. Besides, the conditions of a naval war in the open Ocean are much more favourable to us than those of a war in the Mediterranean Sea. . . . As soon as we have got clear of the North Sea and the English Channel, we have the free Ocean before us. . . . The English twenty-five years ago recognized quite clearly that they would have to abandon all commercial traffic, as well as the regular transport of troops to India, by the Suez Canal, and fall back upon the old route round the Cape, if ever a maritime war broke out in Mediterranean waters. . . .

From the point of view of international law, the creation of large German economic interests in *foreign* colonies might appear an anomaly; but this anomaly has become a regular feature of modern colonial policy. [Here the author gives the instances of Austria in Bosnia, England in Egypt, France in Morocco, Russia and England in Persia.] The experience of modern colonial policy teaches that the point to which the chief importance should be attached in the first instance is to get assured possession by diplomatic methods of certain spheres of economic interest to start with, and then effect economic penetration. The rest will come of itself. . . .

One of the first considerations would be to develop the lines of communication.

It is not part of our present purpose to discuss the principles which ought to guide us in the matter of communications and railways in Central Africa. We will confine ourselves to pointing out this single fundamental principle: *From the point of view of ways and communications the whole of Central Africa must be treated as a single area.* All projects must start with this principle. If we want to pursue a parochial policy in Africa, we shall only end by arresting economic development, and, in the long run, we shall have incurred heavier expenditure. But if we want to inaugurate in Central Africa a policy on the grand scale with regard to communications, we must likewise secure *the inclusion of the Belgian Congo* within the future system, and for this purpose we must try to obtain the consent of Belgium. . . . We



have reason to hope that Belgium, by its new policy of reforms, will now repair the mistakes and the crimes of the past. Nevertheless, it appears doubtful whether the Belgian people is able and willing to devote the large sums of money necessary to transform the Belgian Congo into a flourishing colony. . . . Another difficulty lies in the fact that Belgium is hard put to it to recruit its present body of officials, and, in particular, to find individuals of a better sort than those employed since the Leopold *régime*. . . .

In certain anti-German organs, the idea has sometimes been propagated that Germany cherishes secret designs on the Belgian colony! Against such suggestions the most vigorous protest must be made. Germany and Belgium have become neighbours at more than one point in Central Africa, and both sides recognize ever more and more the community of our colonial interests and the necessity of a close collaboration. Apart from the seamy sides of the Leopold *régime*, the Belgians have shown themselves vigorous and courageous colonists; and, practical people as they are, they will warmly welcome the help of German capital, since it is difficult for them to turn their colony to account by their own resources.

. . . .

In his interesting pamphlet on the New Cameroons, Emil Zimmermann shows how intimately intertwined the interests of Belgium and Germany in Central Africa with regard to the development of communications are bound to be. He insists rightly that Belgium could only regard with pleasure the advent of the German spirit of enterprise in the navigation of the Congo. On the basis of his first-hand study of local conditions, Zimmermann comes to this conclusion: "To-day it might seem rash to predict that in 10 or 12 years Central Africa will have a trade of 1,000,000,000 marks: when the next four or five years of peaceful development [1914, 1915, 1916, 1917, 1918!] have passed over this region, this 'prophecy' will no longer seem anything incredible."

Already therefore in 1913 we find a contact of thought between the entourage of Kühlmann and the chief exponent of *Mittel-Afrika*, the author of the book here presented to the English reader. There is another point of contact in the relative depreciation of the potentialities of Turkey-in-Asia by the author of the 1913 pamphlet. He does not indeed want Germany to give up all her interest in the future of

Turkey, but he lays great stress on the dangers, should Germany allow herself to become entangled with the Turkish Empire.

He is concerned to show how much safer, and how much richer, the prospects are, which are afforded by Central Africa. With this we may compare the views of Zimmermann in 1917 (pages xxxv and xxxvi).

Again the author of the anonymous pamphlet uses language closely parallel to Hans Delbrück's, quoted above, as to the kind of people for whom Germany needs an outlet overseas. Germany, the author points out, like Delbrück, has no surplus population in the proper sense. But there is a surplus of the German *educated* class who could go and direct native labour. Germany does not need colonies to give her emigrants a permanent home (*Siedlungskolonien*); but she needs spheres reserved to her, within which German capital and German brains and German technical science could find scope in the production and export of raw materials for German industries.

As a commentary, it is interesting to see what one of the best-informed Englishmen, Mr. George Saunders, formerly correspondent of *The Times* in Berlin, wrote in the autumn of 1914:—

The settlement of the Morocco crisis of 1911 was one of the worst products of modern diplomacy. It may have temporarily freed the hands of France for her task in Morocco, but the partition of the French Congo which it affected, with two horns of territory from the German Cameroons abutting upon the Congo River, manifestly established an untenable situation, and can only have been designed as a prelude to aggressive German action against the Congo Act and the Congo State. German designs upon the Colonies of France, which have since been openly confessed by the German Chancellor (White Paper on the European Crisis, No. 85) assuredly embraced the acquisition of France's reversionary rights to the Belgian Congo. Moreover, it seems probable that the invasion of Belgium and the destruction of

her towns by the methods of the Huns was part of a plan for securing at the end of a successful war the surrender of Belgium's Congo possessions as the price of peace. The wholesale destruction of Belgium's economic resources, it was doubtless calculated, would render it impossible for her in any case to prosecute her great Central African enterprise.— (*The Last of the Huns*, pp. 150, 151.)

In the ultimatum, it is true, sent to the Belgian Government on August 2, 1914, the German Government "pledges itself to guarantee in the fullest extent at the conclusion of peace the existing territories (*Besitzstand*) and independence of the kingdom." This phrase does not seem to bind Germany in respect to the Belgian territory *in Africa*. The French translation given in the Belgian Grey Book: "Le Gouvernement allemand de son coté s'engage, au moment de la paix, à garantir le royaume *et ses possessions dans toute leur étendue*," is now, I believe regarded by the Belgian Government as incorrect.

## 12.—BRITISH OPPOSITION TO MITTEL-AFRIKA

Dr. Solf knows that the scheme for a German African Empire is now likely to encounter opposition from the British Commonwealth, and the opposition arouses his anger. It seems to him so manifestly unreasonable. Indeed if one could accept his postulate, that the extent of colonial territory possessed by any European Power ought in all cases to be proportionate to the size of the Power, it would be mathematically demonstrable that Germany had too little and Belgium and Great Britain too much. But the question becomes less simple, if we have to consider, not only the size of a Power but its character. It is no good pretending that the question of an increase of German power in Africa has not become a very different one since the revelation of the character of Germany as a State which the world has had

since 1914. Dr. Solf talks as if all the suspicions of what Germany might do, if she had her African Empire, were gratuitous inventions:—

Our enemies, with their characteristic dexterity, twist the facts; they tax *us* with preparing for colonial war in advance, and, as a deterrent, they depict the fearful highhanded acts of aggression which the world must be prepared for on our part in the future, if we continued to be a colonial Power and if Prussian militarism had a field for its rage in Africa.

But one has only to look back at the quotations on preceding pages to see that what we fear is no more than what the Germans themselves proclaim that they intend. If Dr. Solf could by an effort of the imagination place himself at the standpoint of a statesman of the British Commonwealth, would it appear to him anything unreasonable that we should be loth to see Germany—Germany as she still is to-day—acquire a position in which she would have the connexions of the British Commonwealth at her mercy?

We cannot, however, do justice to the German position unless we realize that for Germans the fundamental consideration is that unless Germany does get *Mittel-Afrika*, the British Commonwealth will have Germany at its mercy; we could at any moment, they say, ruin Germany by cutting her off from the raw materials of Africa.

Are we, then, to conclude that the state of the case is this: Either Germany at the mercy of the British Commonwealth or the British Commonwealth at the mercy of Germany: one of the two? It must be ill for the peace of mankind if this is so.

One may observe that the presupposition in all such arguments is that the old state of the world in which every nation depends for its safety simply upon its own strength and the alliances it may form at discretion—the state which has been described as that of “international anarchy”—goes on after

the war as before. Supposing in its place something of the nature of a League of Nations arises, there will no longer be a question of any nation being at the mercy of any other nation. The international authority will be able to bring to bear against any Power which acts towards another in a way regarded by the general conscience of the world as unjust the strength, exercised either by military or by economic pressure, of all the rest. If confidence in such an organization of the world were once established, a nation would be able to forgo many safeguards which it dare not forgo in the state of international anarchy.

So long as such a state goes on, no British statesman could, without betraying his trust, put the Commonwealth in a position in which it was always exposed to paralyzing blows from Germany. 'One can imagine what the feelings of the future citizens of the Commonwealth, British or South African, would be towards the men of this generation, if they had always upon them the incubus of a great military German-African Power, and remembered that there had been a moment when the German rule had been cleared out of Africa, and a little firmness on our part (so it would seem to them) would have saved Africa and the Commonwealth and the world for good from this frightful complication, which made it possible for the British Commonwealth to live only at the price of an unremitting agonizing effort.

If this is not to be, the only alternative courses would seem to be either to keep the Germans, as a political and military Power, wholly out of Africa, and guarantee to them by securities of another kind, by definite treaties and by fair practice, their supply of raw materials on equal terms, or to strive for an effectual League of Nations.

If such a League could be established as the result of this war it would indeed be an end which might seem to repay the agonies and efforts of four years. So long as there is a

chance of it, to continue in the old state of international anarchy, however strong the securities may be which we, as a single Power, obtain, would be a poor satisfaction in comparison.

There is further the humanitarian consideration as to how the black peoples would be affected by being put back, or put for the first time, under German rule. On this topic Dr. Solf has a great deal to say. He implies that the English are dishonest in instituting an atrocity campaign against the Germans. It is fair to remember that Dr. Solf's own record as a colonial administrator is a high one in the matter of justice and solicitude for the welfare of the native peoples. He seems ready to admit that German colonial history has been disfigured by some great atrocities, but he maintains, on the one hand, that serious efforts have been made in recent years, since Dernburg's reforms, to correct abuses, and, on the other hand, that no Europeans have an absolutely clean record, and the British a worse record than the Germans. Here again, it is fair to do justice to the movement for considerate treatment of the native peoples, which had no doubt made some way in Germany before the war and had found support in missionary, as well as in Social Democrat, circles. Yet this would not dispense the British from the duty of examining very carefully what in actual practice German rule in Africa had been before consigning to it multitudes of the primitive races. We may grant Dr. Solf that a catalogue of particular atrocities is not a conclusive argument. Neither, may we say, is his argument conclusive, when he appeals to the fidelity of the black troops in East Africa. For, as has since then been publicly pointed out, the Germans seem to have given their black soldiers considerable privileges, which enabled them to hector it over the rest of the population, and their fidelity would not therefore in itself prove the humane character of German rule

as a whole. For a really objective valuation of the records of the different European Powers in Africa no doubt a mass of detailed local knowledge is required which very few men in any European country can possess. But in this connexion the ordinary Englishman may reasonably be moved by the streams of tendency which he finds prevalent in Germany itself. We may recognize the liberal and philanthropic currents, yet we cannot but also see that the Zubern spirit and the worship of strength as such has still great hold in those circles from which the men sent to bear command in the tropics would largely be drawn. Supposing the political developments of the future should bring, let us say, the Social Democrat Party to power in Germany, the question of German rule over black people would at once become a very different one. Leaving particular acts of atrocity aside, it can hardly be questioned that German rule, as a whole, has a harsh character as compared with British. This is admitted, for instance, by Rohrbach in the passage quoted above where he describes the British methods, in comparison with the German, as "*Verhättschelung*," "spoiling." The same thing seems to be indicated by Dr. Solf, when he speaks of a "native policy based on false humanitarianism" (Speech at Leipzig, reported in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* for June 8, 1917).

Dr. Solf has dealt at some length with the use of black man-power for military purposes. He declares himself to be on principle emphatically against the "militarizing of the natives." What he says runs counter to some of the hopes expressed by unofficial propagators of the *Mittel-Afrika* idea, as may be seen by previous quotations.

There can be no question that the possibility of falling back upon vast reserves of black man-power for the armies of the future will constitute a new and menacing danger for the peace of Europe. The European Powers have there-

fore a common interest in obviating the new peril which has suddenly risen above the horizon. The peril is recognized by our enemies as well as by ourselves.—(Speech of December 21, 1917.)

And here Dr. Solf takes occasion to tax the enemy with distorting facts by attributing to the Germans the design of creating big black armies in Africa. He especially censures Sir Harry Johnston for some statements of his which appeared in the *Manchester Guardian* of July 4, 1917. Sir Harry had stated that German Ministers in office had "indirectly but plainly enough" indicated that they cherished those plans. Dr. Solf replies:—

I am the only German Minister in office who has spoken about the militarization of Africa—in Leipzig recently—and what I said was exactly the opposite, namely, that we do *not* desire the militarization of the black races of Africa! The best way of preventing such militarization is to agree to the new partitioning of the Continent which we ask for. If an equipoise of power all round is substituted for the unequal distribution which has prevailed hitherto, it ceases to be possible for any one colonial Power to transport black forces to Europe without exposing the colony to the danger of an attack by the equally strong neighbour Power. But the interest which any Power may have in organizing native armies will be very much diminished, when there can no longer be any question of employing them in Europe or anywhere outside the country. Since, however, our attitude to the whole question is one of principle, we shall be ready to go farther and promote any limitation by agreement of armaments in Africa.—(Speech of December 21, 1917.)

One may believe that Dr. Solf is quite sincere in desiring to save the world from the evils which he rightly discerns to follow from the extensive use of black armies in the quarrels of European Powers. Yet his argument is a curious one. The army, black and white, of the German African Empire is in the first instance to be increased (see quotation on page 1) till it is so formidable to the neighbouring Powers that they do not dare to send their black armies to Europe.



They will then lose interest in their black armies and reduce their number! Then Germany will be willing to agree to reduce hers!

We should not overlook one special factor of danger to the native peoples in the return of German rule. As Dr. Oskar Karstedt showed above (page xii), the Germans are very sensible of the blow given to their prestige by the conquest of the German colonies. We need not accept as true the stories propagated in Germany of gratuitous humiliations inflicted upon Germans by the conquerors. When the time comes for impartial investigators to examine such charges, they will also have to take account of the circumstantial charges made against the Germans of atrocious conduct towards English men and women and the native Christians attached to British missions. The experiences of the Universities' Mission to Central Africa have already been given publicity in England. We have nothing here to do with such stories told on either side. Apart from anything done, or not done, by individual Englishmen to individual Germans, the expulsion of the Germans from their colonies has in itself inflicted a grave blow upon German prestige. And, as Dr. Karstedt pointed out, Europeans believe that their government of black peoples largely rests upon prestige. If the Germans returned to their colonies, it is not likely that they would be able to restore their prestige, as Dr. Karstedt desires, by compelling the British to do public penance, and failing that, they would certainly be under strong temptation to remedy the disadvantage by revenging themselves ruthlessly upon all who had shown friendliness to the British and make the native peoples generally feel the weight of their hand.

The whole question of a German oversea empire would, of course, take on a very different complexion, if the German state came to be directed by a new spirit. It would probably

not be safe to count on such a new spirit as durable, until a certain period of time had elapsed after the end of the war. And here one may remark that the problem of the conquered German colonies is usually discussed as if the only alternatives were the definitive retention of the colonies by Great Britain and France at the peace, or their immediate return to Germany. Another possible line of procedure would surely be their *provisional* retention by Great Britain or France, or by some international authority, till it was possible to know for certain that new elements had come to the top in Germany and that the spirit of force-worship and ambition had been clean cast out.

EDWYN BEVAN.

*February, 1918.*

[Some parts of the above Introduction were embodied in three articles I contributed during February, 1918, to the *Westminster Gazette*. My thanks are due to the Editor for permission to reproduce them in this book.—E.B.]

# THE GERMAN EMPIRE OF CENTRAL AFRICA\*

## I.—POSITION AS A WORLD-POWER

IN the thirty years before the war it was given to us to rise to the admitted rank of an economic world-power. Our success was great; we used to ascribe it to our policy of Protection. The essential character of our Protective system can be described shortly as consisting in the systematic transference of the work of producing raw materials for our industries to cheap soils overseas. Let us give an instance. The area under cultivation in the case of rape seed diminished from 179,000 hectares in 1878 to 31,000 hectares in 1913, and in the case of flax in the same period from 134,000 hectares to barely 15,000. Our oil and fibre industries drew their raw material from lands more favourable, climatically, where production was cheaper. It became the basis of our economic policy to acquire the raw material necessary for our industries as cheaply as possible; on the other hand, our frontiers were barred as far as possible by high tariffs against the importation of any article of human food. The supplying of food to the growing population at high prices was reserved for German agriculture.

By 1907, roughly 2,400,000 people were employed in our textile and clothing industries; our exports of cotton and woollen goods, clothes and millinery, worsted, cotton-yarn and thread were to the value of, roughly, 1,000,000,000 marks in 1913. If our own agricultural efforts had had to produce wool and fibre, the rise of our textile and clothing trades

---

\* *Das deutsche Kaiserreich Mittelfrika als Grundlage einer neuen deutschen Weltpolitik.* Von Emil Zimmermann. Verlag der *Europäischen Staats- und Wirtschafts-Zeitung* G.m.b.H. Berlin, 1917.

## 2 The German Empire of Central Africa

would have been impossible. We should have had changes in population, more people engaged in agriculture, fewer in industry, fewer customers for foodstuffs, and cheap food with low industrial wages. But the Anglo-Saxons have been supplying us with cotton and wool in growing measure. In 1913 they sent us 223 million marks' worth of sheep's wool (53 per cent. of our total imports), and more than 600 million marks' worth of cotton (97 per cent. of our total imports). The development of our textile and clothing industries, and in close connection with that the prosperity of our agriculture, was dependent on the Anglo-Saxon supply of wool and cotton. The case was exactly the same with the supply of copper for our electric industries. Of our total imports to the value of 335¼ million marks, we drew 316 million marks' worth from the Anglo-Saxons (294 million marks' worth from the United States alone). In other products our dependence on the Anglo-Saxons was less, but yet so great that it is no exaggeration to say that our system of Protection was only possible because the Anglo-Saxons put at our disposal their fields of cheap production across the sea.

But they did more. They gave admission to our merchants, trade-agents, commercial establishments everywhere in their broad domains, looked kindly on them, as long as they were modest, and thereby they assisted materially to open markets for our industrial products.

Suppose we had not had the rich fields of South and West Africa, Australia, India, the Far East, Canada, where the Anglo-Saxons had done the preliminary work, but had had to begin at the very beginning in the acquisition of our raw materials—should we have climbed so quickly to the position of a great industrial and commercial Power? Our rise depended essentially on the English policy of the Open Door. We were sojourners in England's house, paying guests of the Anglo-Saxons. The secret of our success lies, apart from our organization and the training of our working classes, in the fact that England and the countries which are the great producers of raw materials granted us an Open Door, allowed

us to draw on their vast reservoirs of raw materials. If this permission is withdrawn, we shall be at one stroke once more the Germany of 1880.

Now England will not let us draw on her stores again. Since we have grown great, she feels us as a troublesome intruder and means to be rid of us. That is the meaning of the war.

That a keen recognition of the situation has not been lacking in Germany is shown by the following letter which the Secretary of State, Dr. Solf, addressed as far back as the 7th September, 1914, to Herr O. Riedel, in Hamburg, President of the German Trade and Plantation Company in the South Sea Islands:—

Fortunately, the fate of our colonies will not be decided in Africa and in the South Seas, but on the battlefields of Europe, and in view of the successes of our arms up till now I am completely confident that we shall succeed in finally bringing to the ground our worst foe, England. But it is a hard task, far harder than most of our countrymen realize, who only know the British Empire by hearsay and who look at it through spectacles tinted by righteous anger at England's present attitude. We need not fear England's military power on land. Our commanders will deal with the arts of Kitchener and French. At sea our young, numerically inferior, navy stands face to face with the greatest sea-power of all time, which yet found it necessary to call in Japan as well as the allied French fleet. It may sound presumptuous to expect more in this unequal struggle than a heavy blow to our English enemy. But did not Nelson at Trafalgar defeat a superior force? The example of our enemy justifies us in the boldest hopes. And Great Britain's prestige, which is already shaken by our victories over her army, will hardly survive any reverse at sea, for England's power over her dependent native populations rests on their belief in the invincibility of the mother-country. In spite of all, it is a case of keeping cool and on our guard; for even if England is weakened we must not under-estimate the means she always uses in war to make up for her lack of military preparation. However repellent and treacherous the weapons are, with which England fights against our trade and our industries, they are weapons which in effectiveness equal our dreaded howitzers. . . . But complaining is no use. We must fight and hold out against these weapons too, hold out on both fronts, the military and the economic, until we have fought

#### 4 The German Empire of Central Africa

our way to peace and security for at least a hundred years. While we are fighting our continental foes for victory, the struggle with England is for the spoils of victory. And they must be no small ones to reward the heroism and cheerful self-sacrifice of our people.

There is as little friendship for England in this document as in Bethmann's negotiations before the war with England about Central Africa. It was coming to be realized that England was trying to prevent us using her Open Door, and that it was advisable to undertake with all energy the production of raw materials on tropical territories of our own.

The long hesitation of the Imperial Government on the submarine question arose, too, from the perception of our real economic position. It was not desired that the struggle should take on a form which would place our whole future existence as an economic Power at stake. An attempt, therefore, was made to avoid a breach with the United States. The breach has taken place, and it is Wilson who gave the signal for the attack on our economic position in the world. When he forced Central and South America to declare the breaking-off of diplomatic relations with Germany, that was no child's play on the part of the enemy, but a very serious matter. So long as the United States did not go in with England, we could count as our war-aim the restoration of our old economic system, the development of a colonial Empire of our own in order that we should not be entirely dependent on others for our raw materials; to-day, however, the situation is essentially different. To-day it must be clear to us that the Anglo-Saxons have set before themselves the great aim of founding a World-Syndicate in raw materials directed against Germany, and that they will stick stubbornly to their efforts to achieve this aim. It is not, of course, conceivable that the Syndicate will forbid or prevent the sale of raw materials to Germany; that could not be carried through. But that is not necessary; it is quite enough that the British Empire and the United States should conclude commercial treaties with their associates and with each other, laying down

that raw materials destined for other than the contracting States should be subject to an export duty. If these conditions remained in force for from twelve to fifteen years, the rehabilitation of our former economic and trade policy would be impossible. Neither Flanders nor the Economic League of *Mittel-Europa* is any safeguard against this danger. We cannot support 70 million people in Germany, as before the war, if we have not at our disposal oversea territories where raw materials can be produced very cheaply.

*And so now that the issue of the war is narrowed to a decision as to whether we are to have real, and not only imaginary, oversea dominion or are to sink to the rank of a third-rate Power, we must summon up all our resolution and energy to achieve the first alternative.*

At an earlier stage of the war we could still cherish the hope that we should succeed in continuing—though with certain modifications—our former policy of using foreign territory for our interests; it must be clear to us to-day that it is a question of standing on our own feet as a World-Power. We climbed by means of England's policy of the Open Door; now the Anglo-Saxons are going to correct that mistake. They will no longer suffer Germany beside them as a pretended World-Power. And now it is a question of fighting our way to a position as a World-Power or sinking to be a third-rate Power. The struggle to assert our standing as a World-Power is now the object of the war.

## II.—THE WAY TO BECOME A WORLD-POWER

THE Flanders politicians say: "World-power can only be won by the possession of the coast of Flanders; that is the preliminary condition of every prosperous colonial and oversea policy, every policy independent of the decisions which England and North America may take." That may carry conviction to a way of thought directed towards the Continent, but proves itself a wrong conclusion, if one considers more deeply. We are not here going to deal with the fear that the incorpora-

## 6 The German Empire of Central Africa

tion of countries with populations of a different stock might lead to a weakening of Germany, although it naturally suggests itself. But this fear—in spite of all experience in the old frontier provinces—is not shared by large numbers of people in Germany, and so it shall be left out of account.

But I suppose everyone will agree (1) that real world-power can only be maintained if a strong foundation is laid in the mother-country; (2) that it can only be maintained if strong branches of the home economic system are established overseas; and (3) that the strength of the mother-country is in the long run only assured by means of a sound economic foundation.

It may be admitted at once that territorial gains in Lithuania and Courland will not only satisfy the desire for land which will arise after the war, but will place the food-supply of the whole population on a broader basis. The same advantage could not be expected from overpopulated Belgium; that, at any rate, means no further alleviation in the food question. It will, perhaps, nevertheless be suggested that we might find employment for workers and foremen in Belgian industries. But does this and the possible increase of the food-supply really mean any strengthening of the home foundation? It only seems so to a superficial survey, because we think to-day, under the stress of the food shortage, that we should be more secure in a future war if only we had Courland and Lithuania. But we quite forget that our shortage of food is caused more by the war itself than by England's blockade. The decisive element is the lack of men in town and country, the deterioration in the cultivation of the land, and consequently in the crops, the establishment of vast camps by the military authorities, and the unreasonable panic of large sections of the population. And in a future war of equal magnitude Lithuania and Courland would afford us no greater possibilities of holding out; indeed, we already had both of them at our disposal in the second autumn of the war. We still have enough to eat, even if sometimes it is rather a tight pinch; that is the best proof



that the basis of our food-supply is strong enough. But flourishing industries and strong finance are also integral parts of the home foundation; they are just as important as the food-supply. Now it is against these elements that the enemy's attack is at present directed. And it is these, and not the food-supply, that need assuring permanently for the future.

The enemy is certainly trying to cut off our imports of foodstuffs in order to weaken us; but the main thing in his eyes is to stop the import of raw materials. And he had made preparations far in advance. Wilson's demand to the neutrals, to support his action against Germany, was issued a few days after the 1st February, 1917. So important a step—which had a speedy success too in China, Brazil and a number of smaller states—is not the result of one night's deliberation. Wilson thought it over for months, and discussed the question in every detail with England. The entry of the United States into the war and the way in which it was achieved furnish the best proof that England has given up the idea of crushing Germany on the field of battle in this war. The bloodless war which bars Germany from raw materials by means of raised prices is the next move. The Anglo-Saxons want to tie down China, Japan and all Central and South America to this programme. Our great industries, which are dependent on a supply of raw materials from abroad, would then not be able to maintain themselves. For the employment of the workmen who would so be set free we should have to develop our iron and steel industry and our coal-mining to the uttermost, and these industries would not be in a position to employ all the hands who would be thrown out of work; many thousands would pour into agriculture. Whole hosts of them, however, would leave their native land; and the consequence would finally be the retrogression of German agriculture. For a necessary condition of sound agricultural development is industrial prosperity and sound proportionate commercial returns (not cut-throat methods as at present during the war), and the basis of these is cheap raw

## 8 The German Empire of Central Africa

material for industries. Supposing the consequences of the blockade of raw materials have shown themselves to the full in 15 or 20 years, England and her satellites will then declare war afresh on a German Empire which will be rotten to the core, and then our strong home foundation will be lacking.

The Flanders politicians recognize this danger so clearly that they actually base their claims on the necessity of assuring permanently the supply of industrial raw materials. Only they fail to show that the possession of Antwerp and the coast of Flanders actually produces this result. Admiral von Thomsen is not of this opinion. In the *Unabhängige Nationalkorrespondenz* of the 18th June, 1917, he writes:—

If a great deal is being said nowadays about the acquisition of the coast of Flanders "in order to win freedom for Germany's traffic on the seas," it must, on the other hand, perpetually be emphasized that the possession of the coast of the Channel, as far as and including Boulogne, is indispensable for Germany's security in face of the British fleet. The possession of this coast would, however, never be secure unless Germany had complete control of the corresponding *hinterland*.

After three years of war we do not even hold Dunkirk; and Admiral von Thomsen demands Calais and Boulogne with their *hinterland* as a preliminary condition of the freedom of sea-borne commerce! The supporters of the Flanders policy, then, are not even agreed as to the limits of the claims to be put forward. But they are not really right in their view that freedom of the seas is all that is necessary. Suppose the Anglo-Saxon Syndicate refuses to sell us raw materials cheaply in spite of our possession of Flanders? Then we should have a lack of raw materials in the country in spite of freedom of the seas, and that would be the beginning of the undermining of our economic position—which is our home foundation.

In the form which the international situation has taken owing to the embitterment of the relations between the Anglo-Saxons and ourselves, we cannot assure our industries,

our finances, or in the end even the prosperity of our agriculture, by any steps taken on the Continent; *cheap fields of supply overseas are essential to a strong home policy; and we cannot attain them through Flanders.* In order to secure our position we must go a different way about it, and this way is indicated to us by what has happened in Russia and the great points of opposition between North and South America.

Great as the *Mittel-Europa* Idea is, what does it mean economically? There are certainly many possibilities in the Balkans and the Near East, but they need developing, and for that men are necessary. *Mittel-Europa* comes to life if we imagine Russia with its wide spaces and its great economic future added to it. Russia, Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, Turkey can set us free from the Anglo-Saxons in the matter of wheat, maize, legumens, oleaginous vegetable products, tobacco, vegetable fibre, fruit, wood, meat, poultry. The further foodstuffs that we need, such as coffee, cocoa, tobacco, as well as raw materials, such as oleaginous products, wool and skins, we can draw from South America, and it is not too difficult to make Central and South America break away from the hostile coalition.

South America's natural complement is not the United States nor the British Empire, which are both producers of raw material, but the industrial German Empire. Further, both North and South America hunger equally for population, and they will be eager rivals after the war. Emigration has stopped during the war. After the war North America will want to lay out its vast gains, and will be in urgent need of hands. The United States will do anything to entice the stream of immigration to their own harbours. They will assimilate without hesitation all that Belgium, Serbia, Russia and Italy can send them. Now we and our allies should do very vital service to South America and Mexico by a systematic propaganda of re-emigration among Germans, Austrians, Hungarians and German Russians in the United States and Canada, and the diversion of a great part of this stream to Mexico and South America. These countries, too,

## 10 The German Empire of Central Africa

will have urgent need of population after the war; if we give it to them, we shall cause them to join us. But it must not be supposed that the matter can be put off till the end of the war. All that South Americans know about us so far is that we tried feverishly to avoid the breach with the United States, as a section of the Anglo-Saxons. They have seen in that the effort to keep the road open back to our relations of dependence. They have no reason to suppose that we are going to change our policy. They must therefore be shown and told clearly and unmistakably that we mean to take the road to world-power on our own feet, and not on Anglo-Saxon crutches. This will not be done by pointing to Flanders; that will be no use to the South Americans. Just as we cannot alter our attitude to Japan without being in a position to bring pressure to bear on Australia, India and Western America, so, if we confine ourselves to the North Sea, we cannot free the South Americans from the pressure which the Anglo-Saxons would bring to bear on them, if England still dominated Central Africa, which lies over against South America. But our relations with South America at once assume a quite different aspect, if we possess a compact Central-African Empire. South America would have as great an interest as ourselves in the strengthening of this Empire, because it would gain thereby a trustworthy ally against the Anglo-Saxon. And it would make an end of the fear which is aroused by German immigration into South America, the fear lest some day Germany might attempt to bring South America under her domination. *Mittel-Afrika* is so essential a preliminary condition, if we are to complete our economic system, which cannot dispense with the tropical fields of cheap supply already opened up, by bringing in South America, that for that reason alone it would have to stand in the forefront of all our war-aims.

Again, a German *Mittel-Afrika* would exercise strong influence towards the Indian Ocean, the South Seas and the Far East. In order to make this clear we must make a slight digression.

We must reconcile ourselves to the fact that England will keep her strong position on the Suez Canal and the Red Sea; that is almost essential to her for her domination of India. But it is almost as important for us as for her that she should stay there. *We* cannot take India, and either Russia or Japan would become a danger to the world, if either of them possessed the country. The future development of the world must be envisaged by reference to the great tropical territories which provide the food-supply for great masses of people. The two most important are China and India, with their 400 and 320 million inhabitants; they comprise together over two-fifths of the whole population of the world. Can both countries ever be allowed to fall into the hands of the Japanese, who are already hankering after China? Or can we ever quietly see Russia in possession of India, when she already has broad and very rich territories in Central Asia and when her vast population threatens to become a danger for *Mittel-Europa* in the near future. England will not be irreparably incapacitated for holding India by this war. She has shown herself capable of a huge expenditure of strength, even in the conduct of land warfare, such as the world till recently would have thought impossible. England will show a new upward impetus in industry and trade, and she will need her complement in tropical territory. To take India from England would mean throwing her back on West and Central Africa—apart from Brazil, the last remaining tropical areas of economic value—and making these two still undeveloped territories of the future, which contain 30 to 40 million negroes apiece, the object of strife between the industrial nations of Europe. That would put Central and Western Europe at a heavy disadvantage as against Russia, Japan and the United States. A sensible world-policy must avoid this mistake and preserve England's dominion in India while confining her in Africa to the south. Tropical Africa should be as far as possible wholly reserved as the complementary economic domain of *Mittel-Europa*.

The centre of gravity of the British Empire still lies to-day

## 12 The German Empire of Central Africa

apparently immovable in the North Atlantic, although not less than 350-355 of its 440-450 million inhabitants live in South and East Africa, India and Australia—that is to say, round the Indian Ocean. But economically and politically the great Empire round the Indian Ocean has been growing more important every year. The export trade of this part of the British Empire already reaches the value of 14,000,000,000 marks as against about the 30,000,000,000 of England, Canada, the West Indies and West Africa. From a military point of view, too, this part of the Empire has played a notable part in this war—a commendable achievement, when one reflects that the Sudan and the greater part of South and East Africa have been conquered only since 1898. Australia, India and South Africa will grow in economic and military importance after this war. Thus the great lines of communication between England and these colonies will become vital arteries for the British Empire, which we can threaten most seriously from East and West Africa. *Mittel-Afrika* would lie more or less in the centre of the British Empire, and Australia and India would have to reckon with this German colony in their big trade-enterprises. The policy of *Mittel-Afrika* would have a strong influence on that of Australia and India, and therefore on that of Japan, too. Through *Mittel-Afrika* we should really take our place as a World-Power—with great effect on South America, the Indian Ocean and the Arab nations of North Africa; and *Mittel-Afrika* gives us a far more secure position, as against the Anglo-Saxon, than does the Flanders coast, which, on the showing of Admiral von Thomsen, has no value without Boulogne. If by the energetic execution of our work in Central Africa we proclaim to the world our firm resolve to stand as far as possible on our own feet, as in other things so in the production of raw materials for our industries, then we shall have broken the will of the Anglo-Saxon to form a World-Syndicate against us, because we should then be in a position to count on South America. And our economic system, characterized by cheap raw material for our industries

and raised home prices for foodstuffs as the basis of our agricultural prosperity, would be assured, and thus the strength of our home base would be assured also. Further, we shall not thus in future be mere sojourners on the soil of more favoured nations; we shall raise by our own strength a great tract of the earth and have, after a generation, a Brazil or an India of our own. That cannot be valued too highly.

The champions of the Flanders policy are always asking how we are to get raw materials into Germany, if we have not got a secure outlet to the open sea. This question is an expression of the fear that England—of whom certainly we can believe anything—might one day in the middle of peace bar the road to us through the Channel and carry off our ships and goods. That is indeed a very serious and, as the course of events in Greece shows, by no means imaginary danger, in face of which all international agreements are inadequate. But it is open to question whether the possession of Antwerp and the Flanders coast would effectively obviate it, especially as there are very many strong grounds for believing that it will be very difficult to get England out of Calais and Boulogne, and that she will in any case remain there, if we keep Belgium. We should have to drive England out of Calais and Boulogne by a fresh and bitter struggle, and that in such a war we should have France on our side appears, after all our experience of the French, an extremely bold assumption.

In order to estimate the question of Flanders rightly we must go back to its true essentials and realize it for what it really is—a question of security against English attacks. Besides that, the value of Belgium—estimated at 50,000,000,000 marks—plays, of course, a great part if we take Belgium's coal-mines into account; but all that loses value in view of the fact that Belgium does not assure the prosperity of our industries any more than Courland and Lithuania do, and that for our industries we must have cheap and, for the most part, tropical fields of supply. These are

## 14 The German Empire of Central Africa

necessary to our existence; but the coast of Flanders only means a security for the undisturbed growth of our national life. If that is the case, we must decide, first of all, for the essentials of life, and then we must enquire whether the coast of Flanders is the only possible security. And that is not the case.

We have seen how a German *Mittel-Afrika* would have great influence on India and Australia and, through the North African Arabs, on Egypt and the Sudari, how it would produce a new position in world-politics. And the expectation is not unjustified that a strongly developed German *Mittel-Afrika* would force England to keep the gate of the Channel permanently open to us.

Even in the present war the military strength of the German Central African colonies has shown itself too unmistakably to leave any room for further question. The memorandum of the Navy League, which the Committee submitted to the Chancellor and the Bundesrat, referred to this in the following terms:—

It appears, on the other hand, to be a fair deduction from the experiences of the war that the West and East African colonies will be the most important of all our colonies and the easiest to defend. In order to protect them and German world-trade effectively, there will be need of a cruiser squadron able to rely on a few strong bases on land and on floating bases in the form of depôt ships, whose speed and sea-going capacity correspond with their own.

It is a fact of the greatest importance that the German East-African troops, in spite of their small numbers, were twice within measurable distance of wresting the Uganda Railway from the English. On the 19th September, 1914, the cruiser *Königsberg* had destroyed the English cruiser *Pegasus* off Zanzibar; on the 20th September a German column advanced from Tanga against Mombasa. It stormed the English camp at Majorini on the 24th; at the beginning of October the English



force covering Mombasa was defeated at Gaza, 40 miles south of the port. Mombasa was in danger of falling into the hands of the Germans. At the same time German columns kept advancing from Kilima-njaro against the Uganda Railway, and another German column marched simultaneously along the eastern shore of the Victoria Nyanza on Port Florence, the terminus of the Uganda Railway. The situation was more than critical for the English defence; it was saved by the arrival of strong Indian reinforcements.

In spite of the introduction of great masses of Indians on the English side, the German forces had again the upper hand in the north at the end of 1915; they occupied the Uganda Railway for a distance of 30 to 40 kilometres to the east of Kilima-njaro. Then the arrival of a large Boer army brought about a sudden turn of events.

The capture of the Uganda Railway would have made it impossible for England to hold her East-African colony, and would have had disastrous effects far away in the Sudan and the whole African theatre of war. England and France found it very difficult to keep the Sudan quiet, as is proved by the rising of the Imam of Darfur and the struggle with the Senussi; French Central Africa and great parts of the French Sudan were in revolt even at the beginning of 1917, as we learn from reports in the French press. What effect would have been produced by the news that the Germans had captured the Uganda Railway, occupied Mombasa and Nairobi, and got into touch with Abyssinia! All this, as well as the loss of the railway-line, was only prevented by England's power to move troop transports freely across the Indian Ocean.

By means of this concentration of troops England has succeeded at last in capturing the greater part of the colony. But a great German *Mittel-Afrika* on a war footing will not only be able to maintain itself against attack from South Africa, India and Australia, but, in conjunction with the Arabs of North Africa, will represent a Power with which England will be in no hurry to pick a quarrel.

## III.—THE BUILDING UP OF GERMAN WORLD-POWER

WE Germans of the Empire do not realize clearly enough that the war is a struggle against Germanism all over the world, and that it has therefore given us something very great and unique as the first prize of victory. The clever historian, Albrecht Wirth, writes in the conclusion to his *Short History of the World* (published by Alfred Janssen, Hamburg):—

The war has given us Germans a forward move which cannot be too highly prized; for the first time in history all Germans in the world, including the American Germans, know themselves to be united in their desires and convictions. That has never happened before. *Quot homines, tot sententiæ!* We were scattered far and wide over the face of the earth, and our views and thoughts were widely sundered. Now, however, this disunion is gone for ever.

Thanks to the war and to the way in which England has conducted it more and more keenly as an economic war, there is now a German will in the world which revolts against the Anglo-Saxon will; every German in the world outside the frontiers of the Empire is watching the mighty struggle in tense anxiety, and keeps asking himself whether the German Empire will succeed in substantiating its claim to a position that tells in the world, and hundreds of thousands of Germans in foreign countries are expecting for themselves a mighty uplift.

This fact of a general awakening of the German Idea in the world is not, unfortunately, sufficiently appreciated at home, and we do not realize clearly enough the great advantage which this awakening secures for us. And so we still think too much of incorporating some millions of foreign population within our frontiers, because we overlook the fact that ten million and more Germans abroad are ready to-day to link their fortunes permanently with ours. We must not, of course, imagine this readiness to mean that they are waiting for the chance of returning to Germany or to annexed terri-

tories, and those people are making a great mistake, who look at the future development of Germany and the world exclusively from the point of view of their own petty interests. It is only too intelligible that the thousands, and perhaps tens of thousands, who have found good situations in Courland, Lithuania or Belgium, far better in many cases than their former civil positions, wish to-day for the continuance of the German occupation. Men in field-grey, second and third sons of farmers, have looked at the soil of Lithuania and Courland with hopes for their own future. Merchants and manufacturers dream of new possibilities in the conquered territories. Disabled men hope to find a place in the future German administration. And from their own small standpoint they are all making an accurate enough estimate and are awaiting the complete Germanisation of their new narrower home through the influx of Germans from abroad into the conquered territories.

But all these estimates are false because they do not take into account the needs of our national economic system as a whole, such as the process of history has made them. In the peace of 1870 it was a question of uniting the Empire into a single national and economic organization under one management. To-day the firm "German Empire" is to be securely established as a world-firm. Its right to exist is being attacked because it won its prosperity through England's *laissez-faire*. Its credit—that is to say raw material—is to be cut off. And the firm "German Empire" has now to prove that it can stand on its own feet without England and the United States. That is the question at issue! That is the great idea to which everything must be subordinated. The Germans abroad have grasped this idea far more clearly than the Germans at home, and the former will be in their places when they are called upon to co-operate in making the world-firm "German Empire" self-supporting. But they refuse and hang their heads when they are asked to work for Continental aims, to come to Belgium or Courland.

There is no doubt that a spirit of unrest will seize large

## 18 The German Empire of Central Africa

sections of the Germans abroad directly after the war and will last for years. We must take account of the fact that tens of thousands of Germans in the United States and Canada, South Africa, Australia and Russia will leave their old homes to seek the protection of the German Empire. Side by side with this will go an equally great spirit of unrest among the population of Germany. Such a war as the present one must leave its mark on the peoples of Europe; it will be quite as far-reaching in its effects as the Napoleonic wars. We all know the consequences of that epoch to our country. First came the lean years 1816, 1817; hundreds of thousands crossed the sea then. Then political persecution and social inequalities drove tens of thousands every year to America. That Continent, with its great resources and the alluring prospects of gain, with its political and religious freedom, seemed the very Promised Land to the masses who felt themselves down-trodden in Europe. Between 1820 and 1885 Germany lost 5 million souls to America, irrespective of the Germans who flocked to the United States from Switzerland, Austria-Hungary, Luxemburg and the German settlements in Russia.

The Chancellor, von Bethmann Hollweg, tried to avoid a return of the period of emigration by his cry of "an open road for ability" and by promising political reforms after the war. But first of all we shall have to find subsistence for the hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions of the disabled; and that will undoubtedly bar the upward road to the rising generation. We shall not be able to find within our borders proper room for our youthful talent, even without the further influx of Germans from abroad. They see far more clearly than we do that a German Empire restricted to the Continent of Europe blights all their hopes, and *if Germany concludes a peace which renounces a colonial policy of her own, she will have lost finally and for ever her sons in foreign lands.*

The position is quite different as soon as we proclaim our will to stand from henceforth on our own feet abroad by

## The German Empire of Central Africa 19

demanding a great colonial Empire of our own. A great sigh of relief will go up at once from the Germans overseas. And if we call upon the American Germans to concentrate in Central and South America,\* hundreds of thousands in Canada and the United States will obey our call. We know at the moment, naturally, very little of the sharp pressure which is being brought to bear on the North-American Germans; but the occasional short reports which we get show us that it is exceedingly heavy. Hundreds of thousands, therefore, will welcome as a deliverance the opportunity of shaking the dust of the United States from their feet after the war. And they will find conditions of life to which they are accustomed in the States of Central and South America. The immigration of Germans from North to Central and South America will be furthered by treaties between the German Empire and the States concerned.

We shall also be able to attract a considerable number of the Germans abroad—including people with capital—to a great German African Empire. They will be glad to come, if this new great colonial Empire is given large liberties and offers the immigrant all that he was accustomed to find in America.

Further, we can give some assistance, so far as the German abroad, who is still a German subject, is concerned. Germany at the conclusion of peace must take their case in hand, and see to it that the enemy states have to give compensation for the illegal wrongs which Germans abroad have suffered at the hands of their governments and subjects.

The will to stand up for the German abroad is clearly present in the Imperial Government. The Foreign Secretary gave the following answer to a question on this point:—

In regard to damage suffered by Germans in enemy countries owing to measures taken by our enemies in violation of international law, the Imperial Government regards as one of their most urgent duties in the negotiations for peace

---

\* [The German original here has "Nordamerika," an obvious printer's error.—TRANSLATOR.]

## 20 The German Empire of Central Africa

to work for the fullest possible indemnification of the sufferers by the enemy State. Whether the establishment or payment of such damage will give rise to the introduction of a bill in the German Parliament can presumably only be considered at the conclusion of the peace negotiations.

It is clear from the tenor of this answer that the Imperial Government has in mind to demand, on the conclusion of peace, a lump sum as compensation for all the damage suffered by Germans abroad, and, considering the great number of victims, this sum is bound to reach a total of several thousands of millions of marks. These milliards will have been won by our army and will, of course, have to go to the State, and it is therefore to be assumed that settlement in Germany or in a German colony will be a condition of getting compensation. Possibly settlement in the territory of our allies will be counted as equivalent.

Obviously, any strict compulsion must be avoided. But there can be no idea of compulsion, if territory of about the size of Brazil and four times the extent of Germany is put at the disposal of the Germans from abroad in Central Africa.

*Mittel-Afrika*, with the frontiers which we would give it (we should constitute it by uniting the Cameroons, French Equatorial Africa, the Belgian Congo, German East Africa, British East Africa, Uganda, and great parts of Angola, with a surface of about 7 to  $7\frac{1}{2}$  million square kilometres), contained at the outbreak of war at least 20,000 white men. In the first year after the war, if a sensible policy is applied, it might immediately receive twice the number; we might attract to it up to 40,000 Germans from abroad, with an average capital of 25,000 marks, and a further 10,000 to 20,000 Germans as workmen, apprentices, overseers, merchants and bank officials. For if capital to the extent of 1,000,000,000 marks comes suddenly into the country, a quite different life would develop from that which would arise from a settlement by dribblets.

We could also make a good beginning with small settle-

ments in Central Africa, for instance in Angola, in certain districts of East Africa, and the Southern Congo, if we took as our pattern the South Brazilian provinces of Santa Catherina and Rio Grande do Sul. There Germans work permanently on the land and keep healthy at from 25 to 32 degrees of latitude south. In the coffee province of Brazil, San Paulo, a tropical district, Germans have to work in the coffee plantations even as day labourers. Angola lies much nearer the equator, it is true; it stretches from 6 to 17 degrees southern latitude. But there is no doubt that it would be possible to develop exclusive settlements of German farmers in this district, as in Southern Brazil, if we follow the example of the Brazilian States of Parana, Santa Catherina and Rio Grande do Sul. These States give every immigrant on arrival a measured plot of land of 25 hectares, with house and agricultural implements as his own possession on deferred payment of a low purchase-price. And work can begin at once.

It is true enough that there are many arguments against the introduction of small-holders into Africa; but we must make the attempt.

A further essential for the development of real German world-power is a genuine policy of our own in the matter of raw materials, based on the principle that the raw materials produced in our colonies belong in the first instance to German industries. Hitherto our colonial economic policy has been in no way connected with our home policy. The principle did not hold good, either that the German colonies had primarily to buy in the German market or that colonial products must primarily be sent to Germany. Only as regards foodstuffs was the law of giving preference to home-grown products recognized; but colonial soil counted economically as foreign. That tradition must be broken with. We must establish it as the basis of our economic system that all that is needed for our industries must be grown on our own soil. We must only call upon the territory of friendly States so far as our own is inadequate. It is only

## 22 The German Empire of Central Africa

such a law as that, which can give a chance of peaceful development to our economic system and to the German element in the world. It allows the emigration of surplus forces to the cheap fields of supply overseas and attaches them to new German land, giving them a home on it. They are no longer compelled to wander round the world as commercial travellers and agents of German industries in search of a market. It should no longer be the aim of German economic policy to swell the figures of foreign trade by all sorts of petty artifices. We should rather arrive at establishing what are the needs of the population in the matter of tropical foodstuffs and luxuries, as well as of raw material for our industries, and arranging for the oversea production accordingly. What our own colonies cannot achieve ought to be handed over to friendly States under treaty. And we ought not to turn out as an equivalent much over the strictly necessary quantity of finished industrial products. It was by scraping together the tropical and subtropical agricultural products of all the world that we brought unrest into our economic system; nothing but regulation and order and the greatest possible production of raw material by our own tropical agriculture will bring us peace in our labour, will free us from the fevered scramble of competition, and make the German a happy man again.

### IV.—THE OVERSEA FOUNDATIONS OF GERMAN WORLD-POWER

THE main anxiety of those who find it hard to reconcile themselves to the idea of a great Central-African colonial Empire is concerned with the Congo territories, and it is especially the sleeping sickness, so prevalent there, which is regarded as a heavy mortgage calculated to depreciate very materially the value of the colony.

The *Rapports sur l'Administration du Congo belge* again and again deplore the wide dissemination of sleeping sickness



in many districts. In the report for 1908 it is stated that sleeping sickness was raging in the eastern province by Lake Tanganyika, that it was wide-spread in Mongalla, in the basin of Lake Leopold II., on the Lukenye, on the Lower Congo, and in Eastern Kwango; it was reported to have broken out seriously on the banks of the rivers Congo, Itimbiri, Lulongo, Ubangi; in Katanga, on the rivers Lualaba, Lufira, and on Lake Kissale. But there was none in Upper Katanga.

The report for 1911 establishes the fact that sleeping sickness was on the decrease in Lower and Central Congo, in certain districts of Kassai, in Manyema, and in the neighbourhood of Yakoma. On the other hand, it was raging in 1911, and had assumed the form of an epidemic, on the Semliki, Lake Kivu, the Kwilu and the Kwango.

In 1912 settlements were removed on the Luapula and the Lualaba owing to sleeping sickness; the pest had greatly diminished in Katanga, and the Tanganyika, the Mweru and the Upper Luapula sections. Yet the report still intimated that sleeping sickness was lying heavy on the colony.

We must, on the other hand, not overlook and suppress the fact that the vast country comprises also many very healthy and populous districts.

We have one source of information in the reports of the British Consuls about the Belgian Congo contained in *Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of the Congo*. The Consul Gerald Campbell, in Boma, writes under date October 25, 1910:—

The Uele [Welle] district . . . is not only comparatively well-populated with natives of a greater intelligence than is generally found in the Congo, who, long accustomed to trade with the Arabs, can well hold their own against all merchants, but it is rich in those products which attract traders to this country. Moreover, more caravan routes exist in the Uele than elsewhere.

Campbell put the total population of the Belgian Congo at  $7\frac{3}{4}$  millions.

## 24 The German Empire of Central Africa

The Consul Armstrong reported in 1910:—

The Uele [Welle] is a densely populated country. Sleeping sickness is practically unknown, and the few cases which exist have been introduced from outside. . . . The various tribes in this district are remarkable for their superior intelligence, and of these the Mangbattu, with its sub-divisions of Mangwele and Bangba, is the most noteworthy.

The Azande is a warlike tribe. . . . In numbers they represent more than half the population of the entire district. . . . Their sultans, or chiefs, known as the Avungura—a name given to the ruling tribe as distinct from the ordinary Azande—are incomparably superior in every way to the ordinary native. These sultans have shown remarkable skill and astuteness in dealing with the European, and some of them, even up till now, have maintained a sort of semi-independence. . . .

Of the other tribes the Ababuas in the Rubi zone and the Mamvu in the Bomakandi zone are perhaps the most primitive. The Government has, in the case of the former tribe, imposed upon them as their chief an ex-sergeant of the public force. This man, being of another tribe (Amadis), is maintained in his authority by the Government, who permits him to keep a small body of armed men to protect his person, and, in return for the perquisites of chieftainship, he forces the people to work for the Government. . . .

The Rubi and the Bomakandi are the richest zones in rubber. The whole of the former is dense equatorial forest, while the latter is forest intersected with grass plains. . . . The Uele-Bili is chiefly grass plain, but strips of rubber-bearing forests are to be found along the numerous water-courses which intersect the country. The Gurba-Dungu zone has few resources, and in this respect resembles the Upper Nile country.

With the exception of the Gurba-Dungu zone, the soil in the Uele district is exceptionally rich, and rarely in Africa does one see so much food and of such great variety. Besides the ordinary African food, such as bananas, plantains, manioc, palm oil, etc., maize, rice, pea-nuts, millet, sorghum, potatoes, sesame oil, etc., grow in abundance. The quality of the maize, where the seed is carefully selected, is as good as the best that America can produce. Almost every kind of European vegetable grows with luxuriance. And the plains in areas where there is no tse-tse fly afford good grazing lands for cattle. Nothing has yet been done in the way of agricultural experiment, with the exception of rubber, but there is no doubt that grain, such as oats and wheat, would grow if carefully tended. . . .

In the Uele district slavery is rife. . . . Natives are bought and sold, and officials take no notice whatever of the fact. Indeed, it would be difficult for them to do so, because they have actually organized a thorough system of slavery in the Mamvu country. These people, the Mamvu, have been handed over entirely to a few Mangbettu and Manguele chiefs. . . . These chiefs told me that the Mamvu had been given to them because they refused to work the rubber tax.

As Armstrong further reports, most of the merchants in the Welle district are Greeks and Syrians from Khartum, or Indians from Uganda and East Africa. There are great difficulties about porters; few merchants can get more than five porters.

Vice-consul Thurstan sent a report of a tour which he undertook in the Kassai district in August and September, 1910.

He regards the Southern part of the Kassai district as suitable for European settlement in the future. But sleeping sickness is very prevalent. The inhabitants are Bena Lulua, Baluba and Kanyoka. The Bakette and Balolo are on their western borders, half-naked cannibals whose land is unexplored.

The hereditary main chief of the Bena Lulua is Kalamba. Old Kalamba twice journeyed with Wissmann as far as Nyangwe. He fled before the Belgians into Portuguese territory; his son came back in 1907, and established himself at Luluaburg.

The Baluba and Kanyoka are pastoral peoples, very much split up. The former often enter European service as workers or domestic slaves. Little is done for the country. There are no roads or bridges; the paths are poor native tracks. The district was formerly the scene of perpetual fighting and slave-raids. Now it is quiet. Domestic slavery exists. Sleeping sickness was very rife; the great native village of the Bena Lulua, Mwamba Kafula, is said to have lost a third of its 3,000 inhabitants in five years.

The Bakuba are forest-dwellers; they fish and hunt and

## 26 The German Empire of Central Africa

have artistic tendencies. They produce woodwork of an excellence unapproached by any other race of the Kassai. The Bakuba have been slave-owners from time immemorial, and are only accustomed to work at their own pleasure. King Lukengo (Frobenius gives graphic descriptions of his court—ED.) receives a commission from the Kassai Company per ton on all rubber collected in his country.

Also in 1910 the Consul Mackie undertook a journey in the Congo bend, of which he made an interesting report.

He found the district round Lake Tumba thickly populated; the villages looked prosperous according to African standards. He reported of the Bangala district that sleeping sickness had caused great devastation there. For a distance of 500 kilometres from Lulanga up the Congo to Bumba the missionaries only found 49 villages with a total population of 4,068 people in 1910 as against 50,000 in 1890. New Antwerp "is believed" formerly to have had 15,000 inhabitants; only a few hundreds remain. Many decamped owing to sleeping sickness; others died.

Between the Congo and the Lopori River Mackie found the population very much exhausted by the methods of the rubber-trade. That is the home of the Bongandanga, a quarrelsome tribe with a bad reputation.

The land watered by the Maringa River is inhabited by the tribe of the Mongo; the Boenda (Baringa) are a sub-division of it. They have large villages, are numerous, warlike and hostile. There is much sleeping sickness round Lingunda on the Lomako River. The Esanga (Ysenge) district on the Upper Maringa is thickly populated. Round Basankusu, at the confluence of the Maringa and the Lopori, the inhabitants are Mongos; they file their teeth. Mackie found these villages surrounded with palisades against man-eating leopards. Twenty men are said to have been eaten at the mission-station of Ikau. The forest tracks in this district are very good—sometimes 15 feet wide; they are kept free of grass by women and children.

Round Ikau-Bokota, on the Lulongo River, the Mongos

build large villages and make streets; but the villages, which are very numerous, are badly built and dirty. They often are so close to one another that they form a line several English miles long.

Mackie also undertook a journey through the Aruwimi district. He reports the existence of many large villages close to Yambuya. The tribe of the Baso round Basoko is noted for its prowess, activity and industry; the Bangalemas, on the two banks of the Aruwimi, are great workers in iron. They build high, conical huts.

In the forest between the Congo and the Aruwimi the Turumbu have numerous thickly populated villages. There is an extensive palm-oil industry among the natives; their pottery is famous.

The report of the Consul Lamont dates from 1912. He was able to communicate the fact that there was little population on the banks of the Congo from Stanley Pool upstream to Coquilhatville. Sleeping sickness is very rife; the women refuse to bear children; abortion is a common practice. Infant mortality is great. In Lulanga the population is said to have diminished from 8,000 to 1,000. Lamont describes the houses as poorer and more miserable than any he had seen in Africa.

Of New Antwerp and Lisala he reports that the state labourers there had good houses, and were well fed, strong and contented. The physique of the Ababuas and Azandes in the Aruwimi and Welle districts reminded him of the Ashantis. They make good soldiers. There are abundant children and abundant food. The population is very dense everywhere along the main routes, except on the Aruwimi. Strawplaiting had been introduced into the Ababua country, and mats and hats were being produced. The weapons of the Aruwimi and Welle tribes are spear, knife, bow and arrow. Lamont says he saw no fire-arms in the hands of the natives. In Ibembo there is a considerable trade in native-grown rice; in Likati a large palm-oil market.

Of the Lowa district (on the Lualaba) Lamont reports

## 28 The German Empire of Central Africa

that the natives there cultivate a great deal of rice. The region consists of swamps and marshes, and is under water for nine months in the year. Even in the dry season marching is difficult. The cultivation of rice is especially active between Kindu and Shuka; Lamont was offered 180 kilogrammes there for 7 francs. A good deal of cane sugar is grown, too. Sleeping sickness is little prevalent in the Lowa district; the country between the Lomami and Lualaba seems to be free from mosquitoes.

The report of the Vice-consul Castens also dates from 1912. He made a tour of inspection in the Kassai and Sankuru district. Between Pania-Mutombo and Lubefu he found quite a number of villages, but all small and of no particular importance. Between Lubefu and Kabinda (four days' march) the country was beautiful, mountainous and well wooded. The inhabitants were Basongi; their powerful chief was old Lupungu in Kabinda, the friend of Wissmann. He ruled over 50,000 souls; his capital, Kabinda, had 3,000 inhabitants. On the route from Lubefu to Kabinda there were a number of villages with up to 200 inhabitants apiece; the people had abundant food and plenty of cattle. Katambe, on the Lubefu River (north of Kabinda), was a village with 12,000 inhabitants; it was an English mile long and half a mile wide—traversed by a broad park-like street. The daily market was attended by 900 or 1,000 people, the weekly one by 5,000 to 6,000. Mutombo-Kachi had 2,500 inhabitants (Balubas); there were rifles to be seen; the Sultan and his brother had breech-loaders. There were said to be 350 guns there and in Katambe respectively. Kanda-Kanda contained 1,500 souls (Kanyoka). This tribe was about 50,000 strong; the people made good porters.

Kalamba lived at Luluaburg, as Thursten mentioned above.

Castens found the Bakuba country thickly populated; according to his account there are 164 villages lying within a radius of from 20 to 30 English miles round Mushengi (in the Bakuba country).

The Basongo Mino live between the Sankuru and the

Lukenye River. Castens describes them as arrogant and extremely idle. They are cannibals and hostile to the government. In April, 1912, under the leadership of natives from Ikela, who live north of the Lukenye, they brutally murdered Lieutenant Moreti, head of the post at Kole, when he was on his way to arrest some people who had harboured murderers.

The Batelele, who live from the Sankuru to the Lomami, were formerly warlike and very aggressive; now they are peaceable and friendly to white men. They learnt a great deal from the Arabs, are good workmen and excellent agriculturists; they are, in fact, one of the most progressive and most useful tribes. Round Lodja and south of Katakombé there is much sleeping sickness. There is a doctor stationed in Lodja.

Castens estimated the population of the Kassai district at  $1\frac{1}{2}$  millions.

These very instructive reports of the British Consuls are to some extent supplemented by the Belgian official reports.

The white population of the Belgian Congo rose from 3,399 persons on the 1st January, 1910, to 5,465 (including about 600 women) on the 1st January, 1912, and to over 6,000 on the 1st January, 1914. On the 1st January, 1911, the whites were distributed as follows:—Boma 390, Buta (in Welle) 35, Coquilhatville 32, Banana 36, Basoko 21, Dima (on the Kassai) 39, Elisabethville (in Katanga) 360, Étoile du Congo 116, Kasongo (on the Lualaba) 21, Kilo 38, Kindu 29, Kinshassa 69, Leopoldville 221, Lisala 21, Luebo 20, Luluaburg 35, Lusambo 50, Matadi 143, New Antwerp 37, Ponthierville 42, Sakania 48, Stanleyville 106, Thysville (on the railway from Matadi to Leopoldville) 56.

As for the *products of the colony* the collection of self-grown products (rubber, copal, ivory) played the chief part until quite recently; during the last few years mining came to the fore. Cultivation for export still plays a very small rôle; a beginning has at last been made with the exploitation of the vast stock of oil-palms.

## 30 The German Empire of Central Africa

The gold fields of Kilo produced in 1910 876 kilogrammes of gold, in 1912 740 kilogrammes; the output at Moto in the same district amounted in 1912 to 244 kilogrammes. Further, the yield of the mines at Haut Sele in the same year was 63 kilogrammes of gold, and some gold mines were brought into working in the basin of the Gayu. Coal had been found on the Lukuga; in the zone of Mandoko, in the extreme south-east, the presence of valuable diamonds and of tin was discovered.

The "Société Internationale Forestière et Minière du Congo" had mining rights—

1. In the Aruwimi basin over 100,000 hectares for gold, silver and iron; diamond mines were discovered;
2. In Mayumbe, where deposits of bitumen, and petroleum, gold, copper and iron mines were discovered, the concession amounted to 400,000 hectares;
3. In Mayumbe in a different district where gold, silver, platinum, copper and iron were present;
4. In the Kassai district where the presence of gold, diamonds, silver, sulphur, manganese and iron was established.

The "Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du Congo Supérieur aux Grand Lacs" discovered great masses of hematite, and in some places the presence of gold, in the east of the Kivu district. The bituminous deposits discovered on the Stanleyville-Ponthierville Railway were estimated at 1½ million tons with a proportion of 60-100 litres of heavy oil per ton.

In Upper Katanga the diamond fields in the Kundulunga Mountains produced their first yield in 1913. There were, as a rule, only small stones, found in the "yellow ground" near the surface; many of them were very fine. The blue ground has not yet been exploited. The Thys-Jadit group had found copper to the east and north-east of Lake Mweru and tin near Kiambi on the Luvwa; near the Lukulu gold and tin had been found.



The beginnings of an industry are there, but it suffers, as does the whole economic development of the colony, from the difficulties of getting labour. It is not so much the lack of labourers; the Belgian Congo is in proportion as thickly populated as the Cameroons. And the calls for labour were in general less than in the Cameroons. The great evil in the Belgian Congo was a wrong labour legislation, which was quite unsuitable for Africa. According to the official Belgian report there occurred in Elisabethville (in Katanga), between the 1st December, 1912, and the 1st May, 1913, no less than 595 breaches of contract on the part of native labourers. In Mayumbe there were from 13 to 20 per cent. of desertions among the native labourers, in Matadi 15 per cent., and at Stanley Pool some firms had to reckon on 25 to 50 per cent.

In spite of these difficulties the industry made progress. Lever Brothers (the great English soap firm) had 50 white men in Leverville, at the confluence of the Kwilu and the Kwango. The oil mills there can deal with 12,000 tons of fruit a year, the mills in Alberta, near Bumba, with 10,000 tons of fruit. There are also oil-works at Elisabetha, near Barumbi (Aruwimi). The "Société des Huileries du Congo Belge" (Lever Brothers) had as white personnel in 1912 139 agents in the Belgian Congo, 69 Englishmen, 65 Belgians, 1 Swiss, 1 Frenchman, 1 Dutchman, 2 Norwegians. The number of black hands varied between 1,500 and 3,000.

The "American Congo Company" set up factories for the mechanical treatment of rubber in 1912 in Kimpoko and Black River. In the same year the dockyard of the "Société Citas" at Stanley Pool launched 17 ships and 60 lighters with a tonnage of 1,900 tons.

In 1913 there were two furnaces in work in Katanga and a third in process of building. No. 1, in Lubumbashi, produced between the 8th January and the 27th March, 989 tons of copper at 95 per cent.; No. 2, 1,051 tons from the 7th April to the 9th June. The two furnaces had produced together from the 1st January to the 30th September, 1913, 5,000 tons

## 32 The German Empire of Central Africa

of lingots. A ton of copper yielding 95 per cent. cost in 1912 about 800 francs at the works.

In 1912 the various administrative districts reported as follows about the economic situation:—

*Bas Congo.*—The crops were 844 tons of cocoa, 5,800 tons of palm-kernels, and 1,900 tons of palm-oil. The trade of Bomba had remained stationary. Matadi had a turnover of 70,000 tons. The arrangements in the harbour were inadequate. There were 169 trading-posts in the district with 6,000 native hands.

*Moyen Congo* had 92 industrial and trading-posts (the most important in Kinshassa) and two shipping-yards. The number of black labourers (2,700 in Leopoldville and 1,700 in Kinshassa) was 7,450; it was insufficient. The district Haut Sele yielded 52 tons of rubber as against 77 in 1911.

*Kwango.*—There were 85 factories on the 1st January, 1913. 700 tons of rubber and 150 tons of rubber bark were collected. A great number of factories were closed owing to the rubber crisis. Leverville, the establishment of Lever Brothers, lies in this district.

*Kassai.*—The district suffered from the rubber crisis. It contained over 80 trade settlements.

*Lac Leopold II.*—This district was only opened to Free Trade on the 1st July, 1911. Five companies were at work in 1912; in the second half-year they imported 200 tons of European goods and exported 152 tons of rubber, ivory and copal.

*Equateur.*—In this district 21 companies had 107 factories; their profits amounted to over a million francs. Little rubber was collected, only 90 tons in the second half of 1912, but a great deal of copal was exported. The Busira Syndicate exported more than 800 tons, but only 8 tons of rubber.

*Bangala.*—The district had 34 factories. Not much was exported, apart from 120 tons of rice from Itimbiri. There were a number of journeymen traders who took their wares from place to place in boats.

*Ubangi* had 36 factories. The rubber and ivory trades

made little progress; the Ekuta section delivered 15 tons of copal a month.

*Stanleyville.*—This district had 51 factories. Its export in 1912 amounted to 105 tons of rubber, 18 tons of ivory, 77½ tons of rice. The Ituri zone was only opened to Free Trade on the 1st July, 1912; its trade increased quickly. Twenty-nine factories were quickly opened, which in the second half-year exported 61 tons of rubber and 14½ tons of ivory.

In the *Welle district* there were 34 factories. In Welle Bili the number rose from 8 to 23 in six months, and in Bomo-kandi from 0 to 9. The increase diminished in 1913 owing to the fall in the price of rubber.

*Aruwimi.*—This district had 29 factories and a number of travelling traders. The Lomami Company was working in the district. Developments progressed slowly.

*Katanga* had 229 companies on the 1st January, 1913, and 262 trading posts.

These Belgian official reports, taken in conjunction with the communications of the British Consuls, give an essentially different picture of the Belgian Congo from that which still pervades the German press. The vast territory in its north-eastern part resembles the neighbouring populous British province of Uganda and the German district round Lake Kivu; the southern part on the Kassai, Sankuru and Lualaba Rivers was even the home of an ancient and very remarkable negro civilization. The great Lunda Empire, between Kwango and Lualaba, the tributary states of which used to reach as far as Lake Mweru and Bangweolo, existed certainly already in the 16th century, as can be seen in Portuguese reports; it was still flourishing in the middle of the 19th century. The empire was maintained, that is to say, for three centuries—a rare phenomenon in Central and South Africa. When the German traveller Paul Pogge visited the Lunda empire in 1874 its decay had already begun owing to the effect of European influences.

## 34 The German Empire of Central Africa

The Baluba peoples, between the Kassai and the Sankuru, the Kioko, who live to the south of them, a hard-working tribe, who are regarded as the descendants of the Jagga, who laid the ancient Congo Empire waste in the 16th century, are known to us from Wissmann's descriptions; Frobenius visited these same tribes in 1907 as well as the Bakuba to the north of them. All these tribes used to rank very high; from the point of view of civilization the Basongo, between the Sankuru and the Lomami, were especially highly developed; Wissmann was amazed at their large, populous and clean settlements on his first journey across Africa.

All these territories, and especially those between Lake Tanganyika and the Lualaba, suffered very severely from Arab slave-raids. Their inhabitants were powerless without fire-arms against the invaders, and could not defend their civilization. Many of them were killed or carried off; again and again their plantations were destroyed and their villages burnt. The remnants fled before the man-hunters into the desert; those whom the enemy had not carried off and murdered were ravaged by smallpox. And then sleeping sickness came to fill the cup of misfortune.

Between the Kassai and Sankuru and the bend of the Congo there live also some first-rate tribes, although naturally they could not develop so high and lasting a political civilization in this district of really primeval forest as on the southern and northern savannahs. The dark, over-grown, impenetrable forest favours dispersal. But in the actual Congo basin the many navigable rivers offer again sure means of communication, and the best proof of traffic between the Congo *hinterland* and the West Coast, reaching back into pre-European times, is the naturalization of American cultivated plants in the Congo basin. So careful a judge, therefore, as Dr. Hugo Marquardsen is justified in saying in his *Belgian Congo: A Geographical Survey*, in the third volume for the year 1916 of *Mitteilungen aus den deutschen Schutzgebieten (Reports from the German Protectorates)*:

The human material of the Belgian Congo, both in the plains and in the forests, is therefore to be regarded as, on the average, very valuable, even though particular sections of it may still be very far removed from civilization. The civilizing work of Europeans among these people must be reckoned as fruitful and promising.

As for the French Congo—more properly called French Equatorial Africa—Gabun is more or less like the Southern Cameroons and the parts of the Belgian territories which lie next to it, only with this difference, that the population of the Gabun coast stands at an equally high stage of development with that of the Niger. Just as the mouth of the Congo itself, so the coast districts north and south of it were the goal of European commercial and missionary enterprise from the beginning of the 16th century; thus, for example, according to Heinrich Schurtz (see Helmolt's *History of the World*) Loango in Gabun is said to have had 15,000 inhabitants in 1650. At any rate, the population of the Gabun coast has had intercourse with Europeans for centuries, and it is remarkable that the negroes of Loango, as Félicien Challaye relates (*Le Congo Français*, Paris, 1909) sent a petition to the Government that their taxes, which they paid very willingly, might be expended on the construction of roads, bridges and schools. Gabun possesses vast resources of timber in the district of the great lagoons and the Ogowe River, which is navigable for several hundred kilometres. Of its mineral resources the deposits of copper east of Brazzaville are well-known.

The main part of French Equatorial Africa stretches northwards with the Chad territory into the Sudan; round Lake Chad there once existed empires whose history can be traced back to the year 1000 of the Christian era. The ancient Sultanates of Wadai and Bagirmi were states of an earlier Sudanese civilization. The river-district of the Logone and Shari has been characterized by Germans who know it as a second Mesopotamia. At any rate the Shari and Logone districts are very rich in resources.

## 36 The German Empire of Central Africa

French Equatorial Africa is very undeveloped; that is not the fault of the colony, however, but of the colonizers. France has been too much occupied in North Africa and Senegambia to have had the strength to animate the broad territories north of the Congo as well. There is the further consideration that the Chad territory and the districts Ubangi-Shari-Chad are the *hinterlands* of the Cameroon coast and not of Gabun. The route by the Congo and Ubangi, which the French use, is a very imperfect and expensive means of communication.

Sleeping sickness is as widespread in French Equatorial Africa—apart from the northern sections—as in the Belgian Congo; it is indeed a very unpleasant asset of the Congo territories. And to fight it needs considerable financial means. But good success may be awaited in view of the present state of science, which has already got so far as to render the victims of the disease—especially by treatment with the new Salversan preparation—at any rate, completely without danger to their neighbours, even if they are themselves past saving. Thus the risk of the further spread of the pest is to a great extent removed.

And is it not possible that sleeping sickness, which is so rife just in the Congo basin, is to be regarded as a disease arising from malnutrition and bad conditions? We are accustomed to the fact that European wars bring epidemics in their train, or, at least, have mostly done so; are the perpetual ravaging of the Congo basin by Arabs and Portuguese, the slave-raids and the expulsion of the inhabitants from their homes, the rubber atrocities of Leopold's time, likely to have remained without lasting influence on the population of the Congo? And is it not to be expected that the health of the people will improve again with the progress in civilization and development of the country?

The Belgian Congo has from 8 to 9 million inhabitants (4 to the square kilometre), French Equatorial Africa has 5, the Cameroons 3, German East Africa 8 millions. With parts of Angola and portions of the British possessions which

belong to Central Africa, we shall reach a total of at least 30 million inhabitants.

The most valuable African territories lie, of course, in the bend of the Niger and south of Senegal. They are Senegambia, Guinea, the Ivory and Gold Coasts, Togo, Dahomey and Nigeria. These countries contain at least 32 million comparatively highly civilized inhabitants and they are already well developed. If these colonies could be united, there is no doubt that they would be of great importance from the political, economic and also military point of view. But in political and military value they will certainly be surpassed by Central Africa, which equals them in population and surpasses them many times over in extent of territory.

### V.—THE WHITE MAN IN CENTRAL AFRICA

WHEN we spoke of attracting tens of thousands of Germans to Central Africa we were counting, above all—as may be gathered from the estimate of Central Africa as a comparatively well-populated country, given in the previous chapter—on the Germans organizing the 30 million negro inhabitants to supply from the tropics German requirements in the matter of the products of the soil, and directing their labour to a great end. This end is our acquisition of the raw materials which we lack.

The proof that the white man can live in Central Africa as an official and organizer, has already been given. We can even assert to-day that in most parts of Central Africa the white man, and even women and children, can quite well stand four to five years on end, and that he will keep his health, if he has the opportunity of recuperating his strength every two or three years in a temperate climate. It only remains for us to show that Central Africa can very soon give a home to 50,000 Germans, and after a few years even to 100,000.

We must look at tropical agriculture from three points of view:—

## 38 The German Empire of Central Africa

1. It is a question of exploiting the existing resources of the soil and of the great forests (timber, oil-palms, rubber) with the help of the negroes;
2. Those kinds of native cultivation which yield products for export are to be encouraged;
3. We must pay attention to cultivation by Europeans in plantations and medium and small holdings.

Our previous colonial policy had not yet determined on a fixed goal, and had not done so chiefly because our colonial system stood separate from our home system. We showed no favour to our own colonial products through special tariffs nor any favour either to German imports into the colonies. Because we claimed the Open Door from England, we had to allow the Open Door in our own colonial possessions, and that was why our colonial agriculture made but laborious progress and was perpetually suffering from some set-back. We are not here advocating a policy of colonial Protection, which would favour our own colonial raw material by exempting it from a tariff imposed upon all other tropical raw material imported into Germany. That would result in a rise in the prices of raw material, which is just what we want to prevent by a colonial policy of our own. On the other hand, we must keep clearly before our eyes that the tropical agriculture of South-East Asia and India has at its disposal vaster human material than any other portion of the world. The Indian and Chinese coolies are also so easily satisfied that they are content with the lowest of wages. Foreign merchants know the rapid rise of East-Asiatic rubber cultivation. The other rubber countries of the world could not keep pace because South-East Asia could undersell all competitors, thanks to its abundant masses of cheap labour.

It would be quite wrong if the German rubber industries tried to draw only on South-East Asia as being the country of cheapest production. It would be more profitable to us if they gave the preference to territories of more expensive production, provided these countries were in a position to



consume the more expensive products of the German industries. In other words, the German colonies and the allied states which produce raw material must give a preferential tariff to German industrial products. Then the German Empire would also be in a position to give preference to their raw materials. If such a well-balanced preferential policy as that is carried out, our colonial Empire and the allied states which produce raw material will show steady development. Our plantation and farm work would then have quite new prospects.

Hitherto many colonial economists—especially the official ones—have been inclined to prefer negro cultivation to the policy of plantations and farms. They dreamed of a development something like that of the English Gold Coast colony, where black farmers and landowners produce up to 50,000 tons of cocoa for export. There are black millionaires in Accra, who keep white chauffeurs, black lawyers and black hotel-proprietors with white servants. The conditions in the Gold Coast and the neighbouring territories are certainly convincing evidence of the will to live well and advance on the part of the natives; but it cannot be the object of German colonial policy to produce similar conditions in German *Mittel-Afrika*. We must not increase the value of the soil in *Mittel-Afrika* by our own labours in order to give the negro the pleasure of a higher rent for his land. The native shall, of course, share in the increased value which his land has got owing to the white immigration, but it would be absurd to let him reap all the advantage. We need have no fear that it will be to the disadvantage of the native, if we claim land for white immigration in the future in far greater measure than before the war. The chief objection to the system of plantations and farms is met, when it is proved that for a native village 2,000 hectares of land in a colony that is flourishing, owing to means of communication and European administration, is more valuable than 10,000 in an African village under native black rule.

## 40 The German Empire of Central Africa

In future, then, we shall not restrict plantations and farms as before the war, but favour this policy, while we need not at the same time do away with native cultivation; but just as at home we have large, medium and small holdings, so a wise policy will have to work for the same variety in our colonial Empire.

At the same time we shall have, as far as possible, to set aside for the good of the community districts in which it is a question of collecting self-grown products. In the Cameroons great stress was laid on each native village keeping its oil-palms; the anxiety of the Government went so far as to prevent the natives selling palm-lands. But we can never arrive in this way at a proper utilization of the great riches of the country. Oil-palm districts would have to become state property. The Government would lease them to white companies, and would lay down what proportion of the yield should be handed over to the native villages, which have hitherto had a usufruct of the forests. Thus the natives will have their rights, but at the same time the rights of the community will be safeguarded.

There are millions and millions of oil-palms in Central Africa. This source of wealth has hardly been exploited at all. In 1912 the Cameroons exported 16,000 tons of palm-kernels and 3,593 tons of palm-oil; French Equatorial Africa something over 500 tons of kernels and a little over 100 tons of oil; the export of the Belgian Congo amounted to 6,821 tons of kernels and 1,989 tons of oil. The yield of palm-oil from these vast territories, comprising  $4\frac{1}{2}$  million square kilometers with their unbroken forests and huge resources, amounted then only to about 23,300 tons of palm-kernels and 5,700 tons of oil. That is extraordinarily little when one thinks that British Southern Nigeria, with its 208,600 square kilometres, exported in 1912 175,000 tons of palm-kernels to the value of £3,109,981 sterling (over 62 million marks), and 83,000 tons of palm-oil to the value of £1,854,384 sterling (over  $37\frac{1}{2}$  million marks). Compared with these results, the yield of the great Congo territories and of the Cameroons is

infinitesimal; it would surely be an easy task to bring the return at least up to the standard of Nigeria. If *Mittel-Afrika* were only to produce palm-kernels and oil to the value of 100 million marks, several thousand white men would be able to find occupation in the exploitation of its vast existing quantities of oil-palms. And let us not forget that, as we mentioned above, Lever Brothers employ 50 white men in their settlement at Leverville in the Belgian Congo, which can deal with 12,000 tons of fruit a year. 12,000 tons of fruit represent about 2,000 tons of oil and 3,000 tons of kernels. The production of 175,000 tons, therefore, might give occupation to  $50 \times 60 = 3,000$  white men.

We should have to follow the example of the Northern Railway in the Cameroons in the treatment of the great existing quantities of oil-palms in Central Africa. There the oil-palms are thinned and roads made through them; light railways are laid to carry the fruit to the factories. Similar works can be carried out on the Congo, the Kassai and the smaller rivers, and also along the railways. Very often it is enough to clear ground round the existing trees, and the most beautiful oil-palm plantations are there ready-made.

The existence of valuable timber in the tropical forests is almost more important than the wealth of oil-palms. The firm of J. F. Müller and Son, in Hamburg, published a most interesting report on the subject at the end of 1914, part of which was printed in the *Tropenpflanzer* (*Tropical Planter*). I should like to quote the following:—

The greatest reservoirs in the world of tropical timber valuable for industrial purposes are to be found in the forests which spread over West and Central Africa. The most important country for the supply of timber before the war was Gabun, the part of French Equatorial Africa which ran between the Cameroons and the Belgian Congo; these territories produced from two-thirds to three-quarters of all the African timber which we imported, including the okoume wood, which was indispensable for our furniture, paling, and cigar-box trades, a wood which is otherwise only found in Spanish Guinea. The German demand for this wood amounted to 100,000 tons. Mahogany, too, and many other valuable

## 42 The German Empire of Central Africa

woods can be cut to any extent. The vast forest resources in the great lagoons of Fernan Vaz, Mayumba, Iguela, Sette-Cama, and also in the Loango and Kwilu districts are scarcely touched. There are equally huge stocks of timber in the Cameroons and in the Belgian Congo.

In spite of large export figures the trade in timber is still in its infancy. Only a small percentage of the available kinds of timber are exported and only such as stand within a few hundred yards of possible water transport. All the rest are absolutely untouched, and among these are all the heavy woods which would be excellently adapted for ship-building and for use in bridges, harbours and wood pavements. Such building woods we used to draw from Australia and Further India. *Mittel-Afrika* can provide us with a full supply, if saw-mills are set up there to deliver these heavy kinds of wood in a marketable state for transport.

There are vast prospects open to the timber trade in *Mittel-Afrika*; it could yield handsome profits to a great number of white immigrants.

The utilization of the great existing quantities of rubber in Central Africa has been adversely affected by the development of the plantations in East Asia, but by no means crippled. The success of the French Company "Sangha Forestière," which owns property in French Central Africa, and in the new districts of the Cameroons, and whose rubber has been reckoned as equal to the best Para, shows that Central-African rubber can hold its own against any competition, if it is merely a question of pure quality and the collection is not too costly. The rubber trade could furnish a living to a great number of white traders.

When we have won our way to our fixed goal—the most perfect incorporation possible of *Mittel-Afrika* in our home economic system, an incorporation which means that we regard the self-grown wealth of the country as destined for the community, and look at the rest of the soil of Africa as something which may be improved and increased in value by our labour and from which we are entitled, provided we respect

the rights of the original inhabitants, to draw according to our needs, by the right which our labour confers, then we shall have laid to a great extent the foundation of a prosperous tropical economic system. All that is wanted is that we should approach the question of labour and of the natives in a somewhat different spirit from that which we have hitherto shown.

Up till now our system of plantations and our railway construction have caused great upheavals among the black population, have upset ancient social customs, uprooted in part the new generation and depopulated whole districts. It was especially the missionaries who made bitter complaints of this effect of the white colonization of Africa. The complaints were quite intelligible. The missions had been in the country long before the administration and the settlers; they had brought the region round the mission to a high state of civilization by long labour. And now they had to see, at the arrival of officials, officers, and above all, of settlers, the field of their labour emptied, the young men pouring into the plantations and railway work, just as at home the younger country population pours into the towns. And all the complaints which we have heard at home about the rural exodus re-echoed in Africa, too. In Africa, as at home, it was noted quite accurately that in general the changes brought little blessing to the people. Just as the town-dweller, as opposed to the agricultural labourer, gained nothing except in externals, which he had often to pay for with his health, so the labourer on the railway or on a plantation in Africa took little back with him after long labour to his native village but a few gaudy rags and diseases, and any friend of the people was bound to feel sick at heart.

There is no doubt that all these evils will be multiplied as soon as a greater number of white settlers come into the country. But there is no help for it; *Mittel-Afrika* too must go through the melting-pot, and the fortune of future generations must emerge from the sufferings of the present generation.

## 44 The German Empire of Central Africa

A strong agitation has been conducted on the strength of the high death-rate on plantations and in railway construction. But the calculations, according to which, for example, up to 10 per cent. of the imported labourers in the Cameroons are said to have died, have been made very one-sidedly. This is proved incontestably by accurate statistics. The Government of the Cameroons wished to have no labour contracts of more than one year's duration. Sometimes the labourers were only six months at work. Supposing 50 men in 1,000 died in this period, it was calculated that this represented 10 men in every hundred in the year, *i. e.*, 10 per cent. But statistics of the death-rate at railway construction, among such labourers as could be kept for 12 months or longer, have shown that the mortality is high only in the earlier months and then sinks rapidly. Supposing 50 men in 1,000 died in the first six months, the next six months did not show the same figures, but a death-rate of only 20, and in the third half-year only 10 or less.

The diminution of the death-rate is due to various causes. In the first place it can be proved that many sick, weakly and underfed people used to come to work on the railways. The chiefs in the interior used not to supply their strong subjects, when the Government demanded labour, but the poor of the villages and the countryside, the ill-fed and sickly. The weakest fell victims at once to the unaccustomed coast climate; the others recovered with good food and regular work.

It must not be forgotten that the state of health of the native African population is generally bad. The native villages even in the neighbourhood of Government stations and missions are by no means idyllic homes of healthy, happy human beings. Disease and misery are rife, and fear of the chiefs, who are often cruel tyrants over their subjects; infant mortality is high, and where the mission or Government doctor does not intervene with beneficent effect, death reaps a rich harvest. The advent of Europeans has, without any doubt, had one good result—that with the colonists more doctors

have come into the country, and so many a negro who would have died in his village may have become a healthy man on the plantation or railway work.

But in spite of all this the consequence of the advent of a great number of Europeans, with their demand for land and for the products of the land, and especially for labour, will be much distress among the native population. There will be great shiftings of population, with a multiplication of all the inconveniences which we have seen in the past in the Cameroons and in East Africa. Yet if we have once come to the decision that our oversea German stock is no longer to be "culture-manure" (*Kulturdünger*) for America and the British colonies, we must overcome these difficulties; and we shall be able to master them.

Provided then that the Government of German *Mittel-Afrika* will really carry out a policy of supplementing our home economic system by the African one, and will ensure this speedy development of the new colony by attracting white men to it, 6,000 white men will soon be able to make a good lucrative living in the oil-palm, wood and rubber business, as organizers, agents, buyers, directors of saw-mills, and from investment in the oil and rubber industry. Up to a thousand white men can be employed in the transport of the various self-grown products.

If we really mean to do so, we are bound to succeed in inducing 10 million out of the 30 million negroes of Central Africa to cultivate oil-bearing products, such as earth-nuts, sesame, and rhizinus, as well as cotton, maize and rice for export. If 1,000 such cultivators provide one white trader with the means of livelihood, ten millions of them represent a living for 10,000 white men.

There are great prospects, especially, for the cultivation of rice in Africa. The low ground of the great Central-African rivers is pre-eminently suitable for the cultivation of rice, as is proved by the great rice-fields which the Arabs created between the Lualaba and Lomami in the Eastern Belgian Congo, and the idea that the *glossina palpalis*, the disseminator

## 46 The German Empire of Central Africa

of sleeping sickness, finds an excellent breeding ground in the rice-fields is mere prejudice.

Finally, in addition to the work of white men in organizing the collection of the self-grown products of the soil and the fruits of native cultivation for export—in which work, with various side-occupations, from 15,000 to 20,000 white men could find employment—the activity of the white men themselves on plantations and farms must be considered. We must leave aside, in the first instance, the planting industry and look at live-stock rearing.

Cattle-breeding in Central Africa is capable of very great development; we must first take into consideration for the purpose the wide high-lying plains. These now carry 10 million head of cattle (with 6 million cows) and 40 million sheep and goats. That is extraordinarily few if one compares the vast stocks of cattle in India. In British India, without Bengal, there were estimated in 1911-12, 111¾ million cattle (28 million cows), 23 million sheep and 28½ million goats. India contains 4,667,280 square kilometres, Central Africa 7½ millions. It is undeniable that Africa has, over an equal area, just as good cattle-lands as India. The only difference, though it is a great and vital one, is in population. Central Africa has 30 millions as against the 320 millions in India. But Australia shows that even a small population can produce a great head of cattle. The 5½ million inhabitants (not counting the natives, who are not to be taken into account) of the Australian Federation and of New Zealand who inhabit, roughly, 8 million square kilometres, had in 1912 in round figures 13¼ million head of cattle (with only 2¾ million cows) and 107 million sheep. Central Africa, with its 6 million cows, is far in advance of Australia; the breeding of 30 million head of cattle and more should not be difficult and will certainly take place, if white colonists take it in hand. Among the Central-African negroes there are good cattle-breeders, such as the Masai in British and German East Africa, the Wagogo, Wataturu, Watussi and Warundi in German East Africa, the peoples in the districts round the



Central-African Lakes in the Belgian Congo and Uganda, the Fulbe in the Northern Cameroons, and the tribes of the French Sudan. But the cattle-breeding of the negroes suffers from the fact that the cattle are tribal property or by native custom the possession of the chief; the right of private property is not clearly enough developed. That is often a hindrance to vigorous breeding. A numerous white population would produce a change for the better in that respect.

Sheep-farming for wool offers a special field under certain circumstances to the white immigrant, as it has been already taken up with some success in British East Africa in the East-African "rift" at an elevation of about 1,500 metres. There are similar districts in German East Africa round Kondoa Irangi, Iringa, in Uhha, Urundi, and Ruanda, also in the Northern Cameroons. In 1911 British East Africa produced 169,000 marks' worth of wool.

An increase in cattle-breeding means an increased export of hides. German East Africa exported hides in 1913 alone to the value of  $5\frac{1}{2}$  million marks; *Mittel-Afrika* would soon achieve a figure many times as great, and hundreds of white men could find employment in the industry.

The development of cattle-breeding would be a blessing for Central Africa. In the forest districts the lack of meat among the natives is so great that they will pay any price for the much-desired food, and, if they can get it in no other way, will become cannibals, not from any preference for human flesh, but because they can get no other meat. In the Southern Cameroons and in the Sanga forest the people of my caravan devoured herons and "flying dogs," and fought for them; monkey flesh is a dainty in those parts. Enterprising Hausa traders drive cattle in the Cameroons from the high northern parts to the forest villages, where they have a rapid sale at high prices. The breeding of large cattle is, of course, impossible in the forest districts; but as soon as Central Africa is opened up by railways, it will be possible to bring cattle and meat from the rich grass-lands into the

## 48 The German Empire of Central Africa

forests. In that way European firms will have an excellent means of attracting the forest population to the districts where they want them.

There is no need to go further into the activities of large settlements; they have already justified their existence and developed a great export trade in the Cameroons and East Africa. Settlements with an ample European personnel will develop successfully, when the labour difficulty has been overcome and the home and colonial Governments take pains to protect them, as far as possible, from the cut-throat competition of South-East Asia.

We have also had medium-sized plantations for tobacco, cocoa, kokos-palms and cotton in East Africa and the Cameroons; we even coquetted with the idea of groups of small-holders, forming as far as possible close corporations, in East Africa on Mount Meru and Kilima-njaro. After the war it will have to be one of our chief aims to carry on these beginnings, and to extend them to other suitable districts, while preserving the German character of the settlements. There must spring up in this great German Africa self-contained centres of healthy German life, with German schools and churches, and, if possible, a permanent population. It is only so that we shall arrive at a lasting domination of those great territories.

The small farmer of South-West Germany and the middle West has been admittedly the most successful colonist; he has done wonders by his own labour in the sub-tropical districts of Australia, South Africa and South America, up to 25 degrees of latitude and even higher. If we can attract some thousands of these people to *Mittel-Afrika* we shall have a splendid stock for the starting of small holdings. We might think of settling such people, say, in Angola between 10 and 17 degrees southern latitude. We shall have to try whether the high-lying districts on Lakes Tanganyika and Nyassa might also be employed for such settlements. Possibly the south of German East Africa and Mozambique might be suitable, too. At any rate, after the war a serious

attempt must be made to create an agricultural population in our chief colony. We shall be able to draw the necessary men of tried worth from South America and Australia, if we purge our new colonial policy of all petty officialdom, and if the system of small holdings is modelled on that of Southern Brazil, where the settlers are given on arrival measured plots of land, simple houses and agricultural implements.

If we mention now the great mineral wealth in Central Africa, especially in the Belgian Congo; if we bear in mind the great possibilities of communication which the innumerable streams in the Congo basin afford; if we think of the influx of traders, workmen, hotel-keepers, bank-officials; if we picture the 6,000 officials and officers whom the great area will need, the clergy, schoolmasters, lawyers, doctors, engineers, railway, post and telegraph officials, then we see what an overwhelming abundance of possibilities of livelihood *Mittel-Afrika* will afford. It will be easy for even a hundred thousand white men to make a living there in a few years.

#### VI.—MITTEL-AFRIKA AS A FACTOR IN THE ECONOMIC STRUGGLE

WE have shown that it is possible to accommodate at least 50,000 white men in *Mittel-Afrika* in quite a short time; 40,000 of these are to be men with some capital. If we take an average of only 25,000 marks per head, that gives us an influx of capital of a thousand million marks in round figures. In addition men with big schemes will be attracted and firms from foreign countries; the state-coffers will be filled up afresh. A strong economic life will immediately develop in *Mittel-Afrika*. And we are justified in expecting that an influx of private and state capital to the extent of 1,250,000,000 or 1,500,000,000 marks will immediately bring in its train at least an equal amount of commercial capital from home and from neutral countries.

## 50 The German Empire of Central Africa

According to official figures, about 350 million marks of commercial capital and some 80 million marks of private capital were employed in our African colonies in 1913. The result was a foreign trade on the part of these colonies of 286 million marks for that year, 142 million marks in imports and 144.14 millions in exports. If 3,000 million marks are employed in *Mittel-Afrika* instead of those 430 millions, surely the exports, as soon as all the necessary conditions are there, will rise rapidly to seven times the 144.14 million marks, and the imports in the same proportion.

*Mittel-Afrika* with 40,000 men, possessed of capital to organize native labour, with 10,000 small-holders, and, in addition, 6,000 officials, officers and non-commissioned officers for the black colonial army, would be an economic entity with which every country would have to reckon.

*Mittel-Afrika*, South America and Mexico would make our industries quite independent of the British rubber districts in South-East Asia. We should procure *rubber* at such a price that the produce of these territories could hold its own against the competition of the Malay States; in return they would have to give preferential treatment to our rubber manufactures.

Before the war we needed 600 million marks' worth of *oil-bearing products* a year. As British West Africa (mainly Nigeria) provided us with  $90\frac{3}{4}$  million marks' worth of palm-kernels alone in 1913, and  $8\frac{1}{2}$  million marks' worth of palm-oil, *Mittel-Afrika*, which is far larger and infinitely richer in oil-palms, must be able in a very few years to supply *at least* 100 million marks' worth of palm-kernels and palm-oil, if we turn our attention to it. All that is needed is that the obstacles to the exploitation of the stocks already there should be got rid of. In the case of other oil-bearing products, such as earth-nuts, sesame, cotton-seed, copra, elipe and *shi* nuts, *Mittel-Afrika* will certainly be able to supply us from native small holdings with 20 million marks' worth, and considerably more after a few years of vigorous work.

All the same only a fraction of our needs would be satisfied

by this. In order to cover the balance we should have to call on Russia, South and Central America, Hungary and the Balkan States. In 1913 Russia supplied us with oil-bearing products to the value of 58 million marks, the Argentine with over 100 million marks' worth, and Austria-Hungary and Roumania together with 14 million marks' worth. If we add the Dutch Indies, from which we import to the extent of 50 million marks, we arrive at a total value of 222 million marks, and, with the anticipated imports from *Mittel-Afrika*, of 350 million marks. It is only necessary for us to assist the development of these territories by giving them preferential treatment, in return for which they would grant our oil industries a special tariff for the oils which they require for table-consumption, for manufacturing purposes and for vegetable fatty foods, and we should be independent of Great Britain and the United States in the matter of oil-bearing products.

Let us consider the question of *fibre-stuffs*. Our most important supply of flax has hitherto come from Russia; we got hemp from Russia, Austria-Hungary and Italy. Mexico supplied us with pita-fibre; in the matter of ramie and sisal fibre, etc., only German East Africa can make us independent. For jute our dependence on India has been a heavy burden. But other vegetables fibres, which are procurable from Mexico, South America and Central Africa, might well be used as substitutes for this.

We needed 382 million marks' worth of *skins and hides*, not counting the very high re-exports, and here we can certainly get on without the Anglo-Saxons. Russia with Finland and Austria-Hungary alone supplied us to the extent of 100 million marks. The Argentine sold us 74 million marks' worth; Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, other South American States and Mexico had a share of over 55 million marks in our imports. Denmark again, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium, Greece, Spain and Turkey sent us nearly 70 million marks' worth of skins and hides. If we cultivate these connexions and develop *Mittel-*

## 52 The German Empire of Central Africa

*Afrika* vigorously, we can do without any imports from France, Italy, Great Britain or North America.

Austria-Hungary, Russia, South America and *Mittel-Afrika* can supply our needs in the matter of *tannin*; we can get *timber* in ample measure from Russia, Austria-Hungary, Roumania, Sweden, Norway, Mexico and *Mittel-Afrika*. On the other hand, it will be extremely difficult to make ourselves independent of the Anglo-Saxons in the matter of cotton and wool.

The United States and Great Britain possess a world-monopoly in the production of *cotton*. Of the world-crop in 1913-14, 21½ million bales were of Anglo-Saxon production, 7¾ million came from other countries, Brazil, China, Russian Asia and Asia Minor. The production of cotton in the German colonies was infinitesimal, in spite of all the labour expended on it; it did not even amount to 3,000 tons, while Germany needs a supply of 470,000 tons. Even the whole of *Mittel-Afrika* will hardly be able to supply in the near future more than 10,000 to 20,000 tons, however great an effort is made, *and it would have to be counted as waste of money and effort*, if great sums of money and a large force of labour were again devoted to the promotion of our own cotton cultivation. It is far more important to exploit the vast resources in oil-palms and timber in Central Africa and to create monopolies of our own, by an intelligent use of which we could force the Anglo-Saxons to supply us with goods, in which *they* have a monopoly, at a moderate price. We might, nevertheless, try to increase the cultivation of cotton in Nearer Asia (40,000 tons), in Brazil (70-80,000 tons), and in Peru; but it appears to be impossible for us to become in this matter independent of the Anglo-Saxons.

The prospects in the wool market appear somewhat more favourable. We need 370 million marks' worth of *sheep's wool*; the Argentine, Uruguay and Chile export about 250 million marks' worth. In 1913 they supplied us with wool to the value of 120 million marks. It does not seem outside the bounds of possibility that they should raise their exports

to Germany to the amount of 200 million marks. And we ought to succeed with the help of South America in freeing ourselves partially, at any rate, from the Anglo-Saxon yoke.

As regards *imports of vegetable and animal food-stuffs*, there is no doubt that we can short-circuit the Anglo-Saxon with the help of our allies, Russia and South America. Russia, the Argentine and Roumania can easily supply the quantity of wheat which we used to buy from the United States and Canada. We can get barley from Russia and Austria-Hungary, oats from Russia and the Argentine, maize from the Argentine, Roumania, Russia and Central Africa. Our imports of rice can fall off for a time and be replaced by tapioca, shredded barley and groats, until *Mittel-Afrika* is in a position to send us enough. Even before the war the countries which supplied us with legumens were Russia, Roumania and Austria-Hungary. We were very dependent on Italy, France, Belgium and Holland for vegetables. Holland and Belgium can remain as our sources of supply; our own production of vegetables must be increased. For the import of fruit, figs, raisins and almonds we can rely on Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, Turkey and Spain.

As regards luxuries we can get *tobacco* from Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, the Dutch Indies and Brazil; *coffee* we draw from Brazil, Venezuela and Central America in abundance. *Mittel-Afrika* can send us some 8,000 tons of *cocoa*; the production of this must and can be rapidly extended. Brazil, too, Ecuador, the Republic of Dominica and Venezuela, which sent us 24,500 tons in 1913, will provide their share. We can approximately cover our demand of 50,000 to 55,000 tons without drawing on British territories.

We used to get meat and animal fat, especially the latter, to a great extent from foreign countries; the Anglo-Saxons had little share in our supply of meat. On the other hand the United States used to provide us with 112 million marks' worth of *lard* and 21 million marks' worth of margarine. The pig-breeding industry of the United States was the largest

## 54 The German Empire of Central Africa

in the world in 1913, with over 61 million head of pigs. Germany came a bad second with  $25\frac{1}{3}$  million, Austria-Hungary stood third with 14 million, Russia fourth with  $12\frac{1}{2}$  million head. There is no substitute for the American supply of lard. We should have to make more extensive use of vegetable oils, and try to give preference to the fattening of pigs in Russia, Hungary and the Balkan States.

Our dependence on the supplies of mineral raw materials from the United States and the British colonies is an especially sore point, and our chief lack is *copper*. In 1913 the United States sent us 294 million marks' worth of this metal; in 1912 we took no less than 177,600 tons of her total production, which amounted to 566,500 tons. It appears to be almost impossible to satisfy our demand from other sources of supply. Mexico sent us only 73,000 tons of copper in 1913, and Spain 58,000 tons. It is doubtful whether so speedy an increase in the Mexican output as to satisfy a great part of our demand is possible; and we cannot build exaggerated hopes on the copper yield of German South-West Africa and the Congo districts (Katanga). But in our stores of potash we have the means ready at hand to force the United States to supply us on acceptable terms.

Finally, we must not forget that in 1911 the United States and the British Empire produced no less than 559,284 kilogrammes of the gold output of the world, which amounted to 695,340 kilogrammes.

If we take a survey of the situation in the light of the above-mentioned figures, it stands out clearly that our struggle for a position as *an independent economic World-Power and for freedom from the Anglo-Saxons is by no means hopeless*. Of course, there must be a beginning to the struggle, and that can only be by the definite assertion of a strong far-reaching colonial policy. We must avow to the world that we mean to be no longer the "poor guests and parasites" (*Zaungäste und Freitischler*) of the Anglo-Saxons. We must play our trump card of *Mittel-Afrika*. Its value lies not in



itself but in the way it is played. If we state to-day that we mean to have the Belgian and French Congo, as connecting territories between our old West-African and East-African possessions, and at the same time keep calculating what "new burdens" we shall have to assume, keep talking about sleeping sickness and "swamps," the card we play is valueless. *It is only if we lay stress on the fact that with Mittel-Afrika, in conjunction with Germanism overseas, we mean to lay the foundation of a real world-policy, that this card in our hand becomes a decisive winning card.* And by it we tear North and South America asunder, we make its effect felt in India, Australia and East Asia, and attract the attention of the Arab peoples of North Africa.

German *Mittel-Afrika*, if demanded by us for a great colonial policy with far-reaching aims, will force South America to come to a decision. If it wants, in spite of *Mittel-Afrika*, to cling to the Anglo-Saxons, then the cry must ring out among Germans: German *Mittel-Afrika*, the Arabs, the Turks and *Mittel-Europa*! You Germans in America who wish to remain German, pour into Africa and seek your livelihood among Germany's allies! Our object is to stand wholly and entirely on our own feet. But South America will not desire such a development, because it *cannot* desire it. *Mittel-Afrika* would be so powerful a factor in the great economic world-struggle, owing to its political importance and to the economic influence which we and our allies could give it, that it could not be disregarded by anyone, least of all by South America. Neither must we forget the great part which the Arabs have played in Central Africa. If they were induced to devote themselves, their funds and their adherents, to the service of the German cause, it would thereby gain a great push on from this quarter as well, and would win sympathy as far as the coast of the Mediterranean Sea. Even if the whole world should range itself against us, there are mighty slumbering forces in the idea: *Mittel-Europa—Mittel-Afrika*.

VII.—THE ORGANIZATION OF GERMAN *MITTEL-AFRIKA*

As one must build on existing foundations, we will start from the actual economic situation before the war in the four chief districts of Central Africa (German East Africa, French Equatorial Africa, the Belgian Congo and the Cameroons).

We can lay it down as an axiom that the economic and financial position of the two German colonies was very satisfactory. But we will give a few figures for the benefit of those who have no accurate information on the subject.

German East Africa had 1,062 km. of railway in running order; large steamers with a total tonnage of 1,150 tons plied on the 620 miles length of Lake Tanganyika. The white population had risen to 6,000 persons. The area under plantations was 106,292 hectares, of which 56,753 hectares were productive. Foreign trade had swollen to a value of 89 million marks; the actual revenue of the colony amounted to more than 16 million marks. It could itself find more than  $6\frac{1}{3}$  million marks for the interest on railway loans, and was engaged on the construction of an important new line of communication 400 km. long. The customs brought in some  $5\frac{1}{2}$  million marks.

The Cameroons had long remained behind, as they were ill-provided with means of communication. But the colony had a trade of 64 million marks, revenues of its own of more than 11 million marks, and its financial appearance was thoroughly sound. In the budget for 1914 a sum of 1,565,000 marks was introduced for the construction of roads and bridges alone.

Germany only gave the two colonies subsidies for the military administration, which amounted to an annual total of 3 to  $3\frac{1}{2}$  million marks.

In comparison with the clear and lucid financial appearance presented by the German colonies, that of the Belgian Congo and of French Central Africa can only be described as confused and complicated. The latter has a general and a

local budget. In the Budget Général there was a gross deficit of 1,881,017.75 francs in the years 1906-1909. By the budget reform of 1910 the revenues were raised; in 1910 and 1911 881,017.75 francs of the deficit of the previous years could be met, and a further 707,258.69 francs put into the Caisse de Réserve, from which the whole contents of 1 million francs had been taken in the years of deficit. On the 30th June, 1912, the local budgets of Gabun, the Central Congo and Ubangi-Shari also showed balances of from 25,000 to 221,000 francs and a surplus was expected in the Chad district. But this was only an apparent surplus in the local budgets; they received subsidies from the General Budget in 1912 as follows: Gabun 1,200,000, Central Congo 850,000 and Ubangi-Shari 400,000 francs. And the Budget Général was subsidized by the mother-country (1,532,016 francs in 1912).

Nevertheless, the financial development of French Central Africa is on the road to improvement.

The same cannot, however, be said of the Belgian Congo. There the situation in 1913 was as follows:—

Conclusive figures for 1912 were not yet available. The ordinary budget had closed with a provisional deficit of 6,333,354.38 francs. 38.9 million francs of loans from the extraordinary budgets of the years 1909-1912 had not yet been taken up in 1912; 20,220,234 francs were spent. The ordinary budgets of the years 1908-1912 had resulted in a surplus of 6,075,780.29 francs; but there was no revenue to meet the expenditure under the extraordinary budget which reached a total of 60,840,000 francs. That was covered by the issue of treasury notes.

In the years 1913 and 1914 revenue under the ordinary budget stood at 40,418,100 francs and 30,451,276 francs respectively as against expenditure to the sum of 50,933,064 francs and 51,936,000 francs. There were deficits of 10½ and 21½ million francs. There was in addition the expenditure under the extraordinary budget covered by loans (11.14 million francs in 1914).

The consolidated debt of the colony (principally 4 per

cent. loans) demanded 6,692,595 francs for interest in 1914, only 5,487,535 francs in 1913. There was also, on the 31st December, 1913, a floating debt of 4,720,250 francs, and an indebtedness for treasury notes of 90 million francs.

In the statement of expenditure for the year 1914, giving a total of 51,936,000 francs, there were items of 13,972,845 francs for interest on debt, 783,860 francs for subsidies to the missions, 227,115 francs for contribution to the museum at Tervueren, 1,574,150 francs for pensions, 19,000 francs in subsidies for fêtes, 10,000 francs for a representative in Cape Town, 56,123 francs for the Colonial Council, 20,000 francs for the Commission for the Protection of Natives. If we deduct these sums from the expenditure of the year 1914 (we need not concern ourselves with the indebtedness of the colony which is due to former misgovernment) the total expenditure stands at 35,272,847 francs as against a revenue of 30,451,276 francs. The deficit amounted to just 5 million francs. And we may note, too, that included in this expenditure of 35¼ million francs is an item of 6,473,400 francs for the colonial troops.

Further, the railway between Matadi and Stanley Pool always produced a huge surplus, but this, to the great detriment of the colony, went to private speculators, not to the public revenues; the railway was built by a private company; as far back as 1912 the Belgian Government had thoughts of taking it over; but it got no further. The dividends of the railway amounted to no less than 40,417,000 francs in the five years 1908 to 1912. During the same period there was no revenue to meet the expenditure of the extraordinary budget to the amount of 60,840,000 francs. Such inconsistencies could not exist for long under German administration, and the financial position of the Belgian Congo also would soon be satisfactory.

We said all that is necessary about the economic life of the Belgian Congo in an earlier chapter. French Central Africa was still in a very undeveloped condition in this respect.

A careful survey of the few figures which have been given

must lead to the conclusion that a simple combination of the four great colonies would certainly not have the evil consequences for their general economic prosperity which are always anticipated in Germany, even in colonial circles. A colony of *Mittel-Afrika*, even if it is nothing but a continuation on a greater scale of our old bureaucratic colonial system, would be no great burden to the German Empire. We should manage with a subsidy of ten million marks, and for that we should have a colony with a foreign trade of some 300 million marks, which would have risen in a decade probably to about 500 million. That would be the result, supposing we continued our work just as before the war.

But German *Mittel-Afrika* is to be something quite different, the beginning of an independent German tropical economic system, of German world-economics and world-policy.

Forty thousand Germans from overseas are to be attracted into the country in the first two or three years after the war, and are to bring with them, roughly, a thousand million marks of capital. Indemnification of the colonists in the old protectorates and of the railway companies would bring in a further two or three hundred million marks. Economic activity would awaken with giant strength.

Further, in the parts of this great area where the climate is suitable, as, for instance, in Angola (of which we must under any circumstances have a great part, if not the whole), we should settle 10,000 small farmers, people with a little capital from Brazil, Venezuela (where there are German settlers working with their own hands in the 10th degree of northern latitude!) and Australia. Each of these settlers, as is proved by experience in Brazil, would in the second or third year offer the trader for sale, and even for export, products to the value of some thousands of marks. If each one can produce 3,000 marks' worth, there will be a quantity of maize, tobacco, coffee and manioc for export to the value of 30 million marks. The small holdings of the natives will produce at least double that sum, while the self-grown products of the country, such

## 60 The German Empire of Central Africa

as rubber, ivory, copal, palm-kernels and palm-oil—especially if the oil industry is energetically pushed—are bound in two or three years to provide exports to the value of 120-150 million marks. The Cameroons and the Belgian and French Congo exported more than 50 million marks' worth of rubber in 1912, 5-6 million marks' worth of ivory and 6 million marks' worth of copal. The exports of palm-kernels and palm-oil only amounted to some 15 million marks; in view of the vast numbers of existing oil-palms these figures can speedily be multiplied fourfold. The export of hides alone in German East Africa reached a total of  $5\frac{1}{2}$  million marks. The Belgian Congo produced gold to the value of 3 million marks, and several million marks' worth of copper and tin. There are the additional exports of the cocoa, sisal, rubber and cotton plantations (the East African exports of sisal alone amounted to 10.6 million marks). If, therefore, the output of tropical products in *Mittel-Afrika* is taken energetically in hand immediately after the war, we can count on exports to the value of at least 300-350 million marks in two or three years, with the prospect of at least doubling the amount in a further five to seven years. The imports will correspond. Soon after the war *Mittel-Afrika* will take imports to the value of 500 million marks and ten years later of 800-1,000 million. At the beginning the imports of textiles will be mostly from enemy sources; these imports might pay a duty of 20 to 25 per cent. of their value. If we take an average duty of 10 per cent. and if we impose it on imports reaching a total value of 400 million marks, our customs revenue amounts at once to 40 million marks.

The white men will pay taxes and licence-fees of all sorts; the native tax will be raised. Trade licences will bring in large sums, as will the treasury's share in the railways and the shipping on the great rivers and lakes.

There seems to be no reason why *Mittel-Afrika*, if we go the right way to work, should not very soon have a revenue of its own of 100 million marks.

The country will have to provide a great colonial army

for its defence, at first 50,000 to 60,000 negroes under 5,000 commissioned and non-commissioned officers. Supposing these cost on an average 6,000 marks a head, that makes 30 million marks a year. We shall have to estimate the cost of a black soldier at from 400 to 500 marks a year; that makes another 25 to 30 million marks. The colony itself could supply 40 to 50 million marks towards the cost of its army; especially since in the first years after the war the German commissioned and non-commissioned officers would have to take in hand a great part of the administration. But our aim must be the speedy transference of the whole country to civil administration and the concentration of the colonial army in a few large centres and its training for war.

The civil administration of these vast territories will need a great army of officials, of government doctors, farming officials (such as agriculturists and veterinary surgeons), and officials connected with administration and communications. We shall have to count on an expenditure of 30-40 million marks for these. Further, we must provide means for the payment of interest on loans; for this great colony would soon have to borrow large sums of money for the construction of pioneer routes and means of communication. Permanent burdens to the extent of some 10 million marks have already to be borne for German East Africa and the Cameroons.

The new colony, therefore, must not be burdened from the outset too heavily with military expenditure, and this should be met in the proportion of half from home and half from the colony. *Germany must accustom herself to regard the colonial army as part of the German armed forces.* The colonial troops will insure us against African forces being brought against our home fronts in future wars. If we look at the question from that point of view, a demand for 30 or even 50 million marks for the colonial army will be regarded as a matter of course, and this expenditure should appear, not in the colonial budget, but in the Imperial military vote.

At the head of *Mittel-Afrika* should be a Viceroy, a man

## 62 The German Empire of Central Africa

of princely birth, whose personality would be a guarantee that there was no friction between the military and civil administration. The Viceroy—whose residence should be as central as possible, but within easy and rapid reach of the coast—would preside over the central Government; under him would come the governors of the provinces. The whole country would be divided into four or five provinces. These would be as far as possible independent, after the Brazilian pattern; but the army and roads and railways would be under the central administration. Colonial legislation would be in the hands of the Viceroy, who would be responsible to the Emperor. He would be supported by a Council composed of delegates from the provinces. From the very beginning the development of as far-reaching an autonomy as possible must be aimed at. Every settlement of energetic Germans, whatever their religious beliefs and their political bias, should be encouraged.

Above all, official nervousness with regard to the introduction of colonists must go by the board. This is nothing but fear of the difficulties which such settlers might cause. Negroes, Indians, Arabs are, of course, much easier to deal with than white colonists; and so the latter are unpopular with officials. But that must not determine policy, when the future of our country is at stake.

Dr. Hans Schäfer, who was employed for four years as railway doctor on the railway construction in the Cameroons, stood up for the view that even tropical Africa will be a white man's country; that the negro will die out, and that labour will be secured by the mechanical use of water-power. Schäfer delivered a lecture before the Medical Society of Berlin on the 7th February, 1917. According to the *Berliner Kleiner Wochenschrift* (1917, No. 25) he proved on this occasion on the strength of his own experience—and he had conducted over 300 post-mortem examinations—the frightful physical inferiority of the negro.

That is a very one-sided observation. It is not always the soundest men who come to railway work, as we have shown



in a previous chapter. Dr. Schäfer again only saw a part of the Cameroons. There are, even in the Cameroons, very strong and healthy negroes, just as there are in the Belgian and French Congo and especially in East Africa. Yet Schäfer's concluding remarks cannot but meet with approval:

What the first Government doctor in the Cameroons, Friedrich Plehn, looking far ahead, prophesied twenty years ago has come true—that the *Cameroons would be one of the healthiest tropical countries for white men*, when we succeeded in getting the better of malaria. No white man who lives on sensible hygienic principles need suffer seriously any more from malaria, much less die of the formerly so dreaded malarial complication, black-water fever.

The common opinion that the white man, who in general is far tougher and stronger than the negro, cannot live in Central Africa is merely a prejudice. And this opinion is largely based on the observed results of a habitual excessive consumption of alcohol. This practice is common where there is no family life, and the white man is driven to drink. It will not be the case in self-contained settlements with churches and schools. Alcoholic excess is a symptom of undeveloped social conditions. As these become stable, the danger vanishes.

Let us conquer our prejudices and advance with cheerful confidence towards *Mittel-Afrika!* It will soon become a prosperous, wealthy colony—the sure foundation of a great German world-policy, that policy based on reality which must now take the place of the policy of illusion which we followed up till the outbreak of war.

“Free from the Anglo-Saxons!”—that is our watchword; German *Mittel-Afrika* is the fulfilment of this call.





